Information

Mark Gayn


Mark Julius Gayn, the son of Russian-Jewish parents, was born in a small town on the border of Manchuria and Mongolia in 1909. After the Russian Revolution Gayn obtained work in the Red Army library at Vladivostok, Russia. In 1926 Gayn studied at the Soviet Institute for Teachers, Librarians, and Propagandists.

Gayn moved to the United States where he attended Columbia University in New York. After he finished his education he had spells working for Japanese and Chinese news agencies. During the Second World War Gayn covered the Eastern Front for Newsweek and Time Magazine.

In 1944 Gayn became an American citizen. The following year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation raided Gayn's New York apartment and discovered 60 classified documents. He was later charged with illegally procuring secret government information from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Many of these documents revolved around the battle plans of Chiang Kai-shek, who at that time was fighting against the war Mao Zedong. Although four of his co-conspirators were indicted, the charges against Gayn were dropped and he was allowed to resume his journalistic career.

Recently released FBI files show that Gayn was working as a spy for the Soviet Union. In his book, The Man Who Knew Too Much, the investigative journalist, Dick Russell argues that a deal was done and that Gayn "kept his freedom in return for serving as a "double agent" at some point in the future".

After the war Gayn worked as a journalist for The Washington Post. He made regular visits to communist countries where he had private meetings with leading government officials. Gayn visited Mexico City several times between September 1962 and September 1963. In January 1963 he visited Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha where he made detailed notes on what the American military knew about Soviet and Cuban defences. Soon afterwards he travelled again to Mexico City before moving on to Cuba.

Richard Case Nagell later claimed that Gayn obtained information that suggested that there was a conspiracy to assassinate John F. Kennedy. This information was passed onto the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Gayn also visited the Soviet Union every year between 1964 and 1970. He also visited China several times and obtained two private meetings with Mao Zedong.

Mark Julius Gayn died in 1981.


Scrubbing History is a Marxist Tradition in the Democratic Party

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MODUS OPERANDI TO CONCEAL INFILTRATION OF COMMUNISTS DURING LAST 70 YEARS

(Oct. 19, 2009) — The scrubbing of the internet to rewrite Obama’s birth story, perpetrated by Google’s Newspaper Archive and numerous news sites such as the Honolulu Advertiser, is not something new nor unique to the Obama Campaign it’s the standard modus operandi of Communist infiltration in the U.S.A. whose roots go back nearly 70 years.

Just 2 years ago a scholar M. Stanton Evans, warned the citizens of the United States about the tactic of stealing history, in his book on Senator Joseph McCarthy.

Whether one agreed with or despised the politics of the late Senator McCarthy, one thing all should agree on is this: that the history of the events surrounding his anti-communist crusade should be preserved for posterity.

HISTORY THEFT

Yet, in 1993, under the Clinton Administration someone stole that history.

Evans documents this in his book in his book, Blacklisted by History : The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His fight Against America’s Enemies. An extensive summary (nearly 20 pps long) of that book was published by Renew America, and written by Wes Vernon. It is available on the web via Citizens for a Constitutional Republic. This article will excerpt from Vernon’s summary, which is, in itself, worth reading.

After mentioning the theft of historic documents from the national archive by Sandy Berger, to ostensibly white wash the record of Bill Clinton’s failure to protect the nation against Islamo-terrorism Vernon summarizes the evidence brought forward by M. Stanton Evans:

One of the mysteriously “disappearing” documents was issued in the summer of 1946 by State Department official Samuel Klaus. He fingered Soviet agents and alleged Communist Party members — one of them Alger Hiss — in the Department. He also cited “suspects” and “sympathizers.”

Four years later, after Senator McCarthy had launched his campaign to expose the failure to oust Communists from State, he learned of the Klaus memo, and brought pressure to have it turned over to Senator Millard Tydings, the Maryland Democrat who was conducting hearings to examine McCarthy’s charges. Tydings received a copy. Thereafter it simply disappeared. There is in the Archives a cover letter of transmittal, but the memo itself is gone. Some cover-up artist pulled a Sandy Berger years before Sandy’s time.

And thus began Evans discovery of the theft of history the results of the investigation Vernon subsequently summarizes:

When Evans looked for the memo in the files of Samuel Klaus, it was likewise missing. And here’s the real scary part: The Archives contained a notice that the file was withdrawn in March of 1993–43 years later.

That was in Evans’s book. In my two-hour interview with the author, he revealed he had learned since the book went to print that important files on the “McCarthy era” had been lifted as late as the year 2000–50 years later.

Much of the missing material had to do with the Tydings subcommittee which had been named by the Senate’s Democrat leadership — ostensibly to investigate McCarthy’s allegations of Communists in the State Department — but in reality to do a whitewash of the charges and instead discredit McCarthy.

Who in the year 2000 would be nosing around and risking jail time to steal (or “remove”) the memo even then — after much of the world had forgotten about what was headline news way back in the 1950s? . . .

Also mysteriously missing are two dozen other documents “from the State Department related to security matters,” the author reports. The long laundry list of stolen Archive files includes “the names of eighty loyalty/security suspects at State and elsewhere,” and a letter from the head of the CIA concerning one of the eighty on that list another listing of 12 other suspects for inquiry and papers from McCarthy’s own investigating subcommittee which he chaired 1953-1955.

And it’s not only Government records which have disappeared, even the archives of a West Virginia Paper have magically vanished:

McCarthy’s first speech on the Communist issue was delivered in Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950. There was a lot of controversy about what the previously little-known Wisconsin senator did and did not say in that speech. So Evans spent some time in Wheeling in an attempt to peruse records of the Wheeling Intelligencer, now stored at the local public library there.

Surely that file would preserve for posterity news of the events that took place during this history-making event in Wheeling, would it not?

Wrong. All editions going back to the 19th Century were microfilmed and in their places — except for two months in well over a century’s worth of cataloguing — January and February, 1950. Those two months included what are probably the period where Wheeling, W. Va., made the biggest national news in its history, and they just happen to be the two months where the local newspaper’s back issues are missing. What was reported in that daily newspaper that would inspire someone to wipe out the record as if it never happened?

And even the Library of Congress:

Evans then figured not to worry. He would simply go to the Library of Congress which keeps records of newspapers and other publications from around the country. The library had issues of the Wheeling Intelligencer, but none prior to August, 1952.

And the whitewash of history, was not confined the Clinton years, the Democrats in Congress were up to it even in McCarthy’s day:

Again, the Tydings committee — formally charged with investigating McCarthy’s charges of the State Department cover-up — in reality, was charged by the Senate’s then-Democrat majority with putting the lid on the whole thing.

When the committee issued its final report, one of the Republican members, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, noted that 35 pages of stenographic record in the final hearing were missing. Not included (surprise!) were Senator Lodge’s comments toward the end of the hearings that many significant topics had not been covered or had been swept under the rug in Tydings’ “probe.” The New England Republican outlined a series of questions that had not been answered.

When Lodge indignantly took his complaint to the Senate floor, all hell broke loose.

Exhibiting as much anger as his Boston blue-blood upbringing would allow, Senator Lodge charged the disappearance “obviously wasn’t accidental” and that “[s]omebody had surgically removed” the 35 pages because the last pages in the transcript, including the part about adjournment, were tacked on to give the false impression of a complete record.

The Amerasia Affair & Coverup

One very important case regarding Communist infiltration and theft of top-secret documents during these years was the Amerasia Magazine, run by the Institute for Pacific Relations and funded in part by the Rockefeller Foundation the FBI found 1,800 stolen documents in the magazine’s offices, and evidence that these were being passed on to the Communists in China.

The Democratic Leadership squashed the investigation and tried to hide it away:

When the agents entered the Amerasia offices in the middle of the night, they recovered 1800 documents, stolen from the secret files of many government agencies involved in national security, including secret information on the position of the armies of the then pro-Western government of China. Naturally, these were of great interest to the Chinese Communist military revolutionaries then seeking to overthrow (ultimately with success) that American-friendly government.

After the break-in, the bureau arrested Philip Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, Mark Gayn, Andrew Roth, John Stewart Service, and Emanuel Larson — the latter two from the State Department. All six — connected in one way or another with the magazine — had Communist or pro-Communist backgrounds.

The case garnered a brief whirlwind of publicity at the time, but not much beyond that. In relatively short order, all six escaped jail time, some of them paying light fines or other slaps on the wrist or getting off scot-free.

Service — a diplomat who spent much of World War II in China, where he set about deriding the pro-Western Chinese government and praising the Communists as “simple agrarian reformers” — was able to avoid indictment in part because his position at the State Department provided him with ample “connections.” He slipped through the loose jaws of justice, notwithstanding that he was caught by the FBI passing secret documents to Jaffe (Amerasia’s editor) — the latter described by Evans as “a zealous Marxist” and “one of the more unusual characters in the murky byways of subversion.” Service would later become one of McCarthy’s listed State Department cases. Jaffe would also be mentioned, as well as Owen Lattimore (about whom more below).

Stan Evans has unearthed an FBI report on a Service/Jaffe meeting here in Washington where Service warned (while the FBI recorders were surreptitiously taking it all in) that “what I said about the military plans, of course, is very secret.” The two held several such clandestine (or so they thought) meetings.

Vernon then summarizes what follows:

Shortly after the Amerasia case was wiped off the national radar, some lawmakers, including Congressman George Dondero (R-Mich.), demanded to know how such an important and far-reaching case could crumble so quickly. Democrats (then in control of Congress) held a hearing on the matter behind closed doors and without putting anyone under oath. Justice Department prosecutor Robert Hitchcock described the whole thing as nothing more than “teacup gossip.”

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover went “ballistic” (Evans reports in “Blacklisted by History”). After all, the FBI had wiretaps and other documentation on the whole conspiracy. At the time of the arrests, Hoover had reportedly described it as “a 100 percent airtight case,” only to see it covered up soon thereafter at the highest levels.

“Tommy the Cork”

Not until the late nineties was it publicly known that a major string-puller in the Amerasia cover-up of a half century ago was a veteran “Mr. Fixit,” Thomas “Tommy the Cork” Corcoran. He had lived in the White House at President Roosevelt’s side and later became a Washington lawyer.

“Tommy the Cork,” so nicknamed by FDR, was not regarded with the same degree of affection at the White House after Harry Truman became president. “The new President,” according to Evans’ book on Joe McCarthy, “had certain suspicions about the New Deal wheelhorse,” and put the FBI on his trail. There they found him up to his ears “in the Amerasia quagmire,” working with pro-Soviet FDR aide Laughlin Currie (John Stewart Service’s mentor) to make sure Service was not indicted. As a result, reports the author, “Service would walk free and clear from any legal sanctions. Not one of the people being [wire]tapped, according to Bureau records, dissented from this felonious project.”

Samples of the wiretapped conversations in the cover-up

Corcoran: What I want to do is get this guy [Service] out. These other fellows want to make a Dreyfus case out of it.

Currie: Yeah, but the important thing is to get him out.

Later

Corcoran (to Service): I talked to the Attorney General [Tom Clark, later elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court] and … l did want you to know that I’d gone right to the top on this damn thing, and I’m quite sure I’ll get it cut out [i.e., spare your name from going to the Grand Jury]

Conclusion

In the last year, U.S. Citizens who have questioned the ascendency of Barack Hussein Obama have been attack publicly and privately, in the press, on TV, and in Internet forums and blogs, as being conspiracy theorists. Yet the facts of history prove that it is the liberal media, the Democratic Party, and known Marxists, Communists, and Socialists at the highest levels of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches of the Federal Government who have entered into a conspiracy to whitewash history to advance the careers of known Marxist sympathizers.

The scrubbing of history in the McCarthy accusations Affair, had this purpose: to conceal the infiltrators the KGB was moving up to positions of power and influence in America. Indeed, with the fall of Communism in Russia and the publication of KGB files, it has been found that nearly 95% of those accused by Senator McCarthy were either KGB agents, informants, or collaborators.

The bitter fruit of this 70 effort and infiltration and history theft, is the Communist takeover of government which occurred at the last national election. And unless America rises up against this takeover, it may very well have been the last national election.


Case #3

34. The [In-] House Poster Group (本社宣画组). Long Live the Victory of the People’s War(人民战争胜利万岁). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Fine Art Publishing House, November 1966.

35-36. Mao Zedong (1893-1976). Chairman Mao on People’s War. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967.

37. Lin Biao (1907-1971). Long Live the Victory of People’s War. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1968.

38. Mao Zedong. Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966

39. Girl Gunner Doll, wind-up toy (女民兵, 动态玩具). Ca. 1967.

40. Don’t Love Red Dresses, Love Military Uniforms (不爱红装爱武装), postcard, after a painting of 1966. Ca. 1966-67.

41. Quotations from Chairman Mao: The Mass Line(毛主席语录: 群众路线). From Selected Papercuts after [Mao’s] Quotations (语录画刻纸选). Ca. 1968.

42. Badge with the text ‘Quotations from Chairman Mao: The Mass Line’ (毛主席语录:群众路线). Ca. 1968.

43. Warrior of Steel Armed with Chairman Mao Thought – Mai Xiande(毛主席思想武装的钢铁战士 -麦贤得). Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Pictorial Press, 1962.

44. Mark Gayn (1902-1981). Possibly as many as 100 million Chinese are enrolled in the militia, in which they receive military training. A scene in a Peking street. 1965.


Police Training, “Nation-Building,” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 植民地独立後の韓国における警察官訓練、「国家建設」および政治的抑圧

As American troops became bogged down first in Iraq and then Afghanistan, a key component of U.S. strategy was to build up local police and security forces in an attempt to establish law and order. This approach is consistent with practices honed over more than a century in developing nations within the expanding orbit of American global power. From the conquest of the Philippines and Haiti at the turn of the twentieth century through Cold War interventions and the War on Terror, police training has been valued as a cost-effective means of suppressing radical and nationalist movements, precluding the need for direct U.S. military intervention, thereby avoiding the public opposition it often arouses and the expense it invariably entails. Carried out by multiple agencies, including the military, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, most recently private mercenary firms such as DynCorp, the programs have helped to fortify and gain leverage over the internal security apparatus of client regimes and provided an opportunity to export and test new policing technologies and administrative techniques, as well as modern weaponry and equipment which has all too often been used for repressive ends.

American advisers from the OSS, FBI, Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), and the New York Police Department began instructing Chinese Guomindang leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)&rsquos secret police, commanded by Dai Li, in the late 1930s. The focus, OSS agent Milton Miles wrote, was on &ldquopolitical crimes and means of effective repression&rdquo against the communist movement, adding that the Americans were never able to &ldquoseparate police activities from guerrilla activities.&rdquo Clandestine police training in China set a precedent for Japan and South Korea under U.S. occupation, where police advisers provided training in riot control, set up modern communications and record-collection systems, and helped amass thousands of dossiers on alleged communists, weaving information into a dark tapestry of &ldquothreat&rdquo where sober analysis might have found none. 2 Civil liberties and democratic standards were subordinated to larger geo-strategic goals centered on containing Chinese communist influence and rolling back the progress of the left.

Throughout the Cold War, the budget for police programs was highest in East and Southeast Asia. The United States had always prized the region as one of the richest and most strategically located in the world, hoping to convert it into what General Douglas MacArthur characterized as an &ldquoAnglo-Saxon lake.&rdquo 1 In postwar South Korea, the focus of this article, the United States helped to empower former Japanese colonial agents and consolidated the rule of Syngman Rhee, an anticommunist who deployed police against leftists seeking a transformation of the political economy and reconciliation with the North. While praising the principle that police in a democratic nation should be impartial and nonpartisan, American advisers mobilized police primarily along political lines and built up a constabulary force which provided the backbone of the South Korean Army (ROKA). Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) officers used the programs to recruit agents for clandestine missions into the North, which was an important factor precipitating the Korean War. Political policing operations continued through the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in significant human rights violations. The South Korean police became known for torture and brutality, and the US bore important responsibility for this development.

Conscience and Convenience: The Consolidation of a U.S. Sphere

As Bruce Cumings notes in The Origins of the Korean War, the ROK was more of an American creation than any other postwar Asian regime. The CIA predicted that its economy would collapse in a matter of weeks if U.S. aid were terminated. 3 As with Jiang Jieshi in China and Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, U.S. diplomats tired of Syngman Rhee&rsquos conservatism and unwillingness to promote basic land reform, though they stood by him as a bulwark against communism.The CIA considered the Princeton Ph.D. a &ldquodemagogue bent on autocratic rule&rdquowhose support was maintained by that &ldquonumerically small class which virtually monopolizes the native wealth.&rdquo 4

A crucial aim of US policy was to contain the spread of the northern revolution and to open up South Korea&rsquos economy to its former colonial master Japan thereby helping keep Japan in the Western orbit. In January 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall scribbled a note to Dean Acheson: &ldquoPlease have plan drafted of policy to organize a definite government of So. Korea and connect up its economy with that of Japan.&rdquo 5

The American occupation was headed by General John Reed Hodge, an Illinois farmer known as the &ldquoPatton of the Pacific,&rdquo who knew little about Korea. He worked to build a professional police force, which he believed to be pivotal to &ldquonation-building&rdquo efforts its central aim was to stamp out the political left and bolster Rhee&rsquos power. A secret history of the Korean National Police (KNP) argued, &ldquoNo one can anticipate what insidious infiltration may develop, and [so] the police must be given latitude to carry out the desires of the new government more so than would be necessary in normal times.&rdquo 6 The KNP consequently evolved as a politicized in the hands of many who had served in the Japanese occupation of Korea (which lasted from 1910 to 1945) and saw almost all opposition as communist driven. The CIA bluntly noted that &ldquoextreme Rightists control the overt political structure in the U.S. zone mainly through the agency of the national police,&rdquo which has been &ldquoruthlessly brutal in suppressing disorder. . . . [T]he police generally regard the Communists as rebels and traitors who should be seized, imprisoned, and shot, sometimes on the slightest provocation.&rdquo 7

During the period of Japanese rule, the national police presided over a sophisticated surveillance apparatus, dominating &ldquoevery phase of daily activity,&rdquo according to the State Department, through &ldquoterror, intimidation, and practices inconceivable to the American.&rdquo 8 U.S. rule was marred by colonial continuities, including a blatant carryover of personnel. In principle, occupation officials sought to purge collaborators and wipe out the vestiges of the old system by training police in democratic methods, instilling in them the maxim that they were &ldquoservants and not masters of the people.&rdquo The new police slogan, according to the Americans, was &ldquoimpartial and non-partisan.&rdquo 9 In practice, however, political exigencies led to the abandonment of those ideals.

The AMG retained 80 percent of pro-Japanese officers above the rank of patrolman, including northern exiles experienced in suppressing the anticolonial underground. As Colonel William Maglin, the first director of the KNP, commented, &ldquoWe felt that if the Korean element of the KNP did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for us.&rdquo A June 1947 survey determined that eight of ten provincial police chiefs and 60 percent of the lower-ranking lieutenants were Japanese-trained, a crucial factor triggering opposition to the police. 10 To head the organization, Hodge appointed Chang T&rsquoaek-Sang and Chough Pyong-Ok, known for their &ldquoharsh police methods directed ruthlessly against Korean leftists.&rdquo Chang, a wealthy businessman with ties to the missionary community, had prospered under the Japanese. The Marine Corps historian Harold Larsen described him as &ldquoa ruthless and crass character with the face of Nero and the manners of Goering.&rdquo 11

Syngman Rhee (left), Kim Koo and John Hodge

In the first days of the U.S. occupation, chaos prevailed. Prison doors were thrown open, police records were destroyed, and Koreans confiscated Japanese property, which led to violence. In some places, leftists seized power and installed their own governments. The police were demoralized and had to be accompanied on rounds by American military officers. 12 A reorganization plan was drawn up by Major Arthur F. Brandstatter, who was flown in from Manila, where he had served with the military police. A bruising fullback with the Michigan State football team in the mid-1930s, Brandstatter was a veteran of the Detroit (1938&ndash1941) and East Lansing police (chief 1946) and professor of police administration at Michigan State University. He emphasized the importance of creating standard uniforms for the KNP, improving communications, and abolishing the thought-control police, who had amassed 900,000 fingerprint files.

The United States Military Advisory Group in Korea (USMAGIK) responded to Brandstatter&rsquos report by providing sixty-three police advisers who developed a network of thirty-nine radio stations and fourteen thousand miles of

telephone lines, resulting in the upgrading of communications facilities from &ldquofair&rdquo to &ldquogood.&rdquo Manpower was stabilized at twenty thousand, and swords and clubs were replaced with machine guns and rifles. Americans were appointed police chiefs in every province, with the mandate of grooming a Korean successor. Typical was the background of Lieutenant Colonel Earle Miller, stationed in Kyonggi-do province, a twenty-six-year veteran of the Chicago police and supervisor of military police detachments and POW camps. 13 Brandstatter, who commented in a December 1945 interview that the Koreans were &ldquofifty years behind us in their thinking on justice and police powers&rdquo noted that high turnover among American advisers was hampering the police program and predicted that, regardless of the amount of U.S. aid, the police bureau would become a &ldquopolitical plum&rdquo belonging to &ldquoa big shot in the new government&rdquo (a prediction that proved accurate). 14

Starting with a budget of 1.5 billion won per annum (over $1 million U.S.), the Public Safety Division rebuilt police headquarters, adopted a uniform patterned after that of the New York Police Department, and eliminated the system

in which officers were on call for twenty-four hours. It improved record collection by importing filing cabinets and oversaw the opening of a modern crime laboratory in Seoul staffed by eight Korean technicians trained in ballistics,

chemical analysis, and handwriting techniques. Police advisers recommended routine patrols to foster improved community relations, and established provincial training centers and, under Lewis Valentine&rsquos oversight, a national

police academy, which opened on October 10, 1945. Many of the graduates, including forty-five policewomen, reportedly went on to &ldquodistinguish themselves as guerrilla fighters.&rdquo Chi Hwan Choi, a graduate of the academy, rose

to become superintendent and chief of the uniformed police. 15

Staff at the academy provided training in firearms and riot control and lectures on anticommunism, and were supplied with over six thousand pistols and one thousand carbines and rifles. J. Edgar Hoover&rsquos G-men were solicited for instruction in surveillance, interrogation and wiretapping techniques, which they had also provided to Dai Li&rsquos secret police in China. In December 1945, USMAGIK opened a school for detectives in Seoul and established a special &ldquosubversive sub-section,&rdquo which kept a blacklist of dissidents. American training generally emphasized the development of an effective police force in light of the threats of subversion and insurgency, creating a trend toward militarization of the police. 16

In January 1946, USMAGIK began developing the police constabulary, which provided the foundation for the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). The chief adviser, Captain James Hausman, was a combat veteran who provided instruction in riot control and psychological warfare techniques such as dousing the corpses of executed people with gasoline so as to hide the manner of execution or to allow blame to be placed on the communists. Douglas MacArthur forestalled the delivery of .50-caliber machine guns and howitzers &ldquoin order to maintain [the] appearance [of the constabulary] . . . as a police-type reserve force.&rdquo Most of the officers were Japanese army veterans. Although they were not authorized to make arrests, they consistently ignored &ldquothis lack of legal right.&rdquo The constabulary gained valuable guerrilla experience suppressing rebellions in Cheju-do and Yosu, committing numerous atrocities in the process. It became infiltrated by leftists, however, who instigated several mutinies. 17 Characterizing Koreans as &ldquobrutal bastards, worse than the Japanese,&rdquo Hausman worked to purge radical elements, impose discipline, and bolster intelligence gathering. At these tasks he was successful, especially in comparison to American advisory efforts in South Vietnam. 18 Like the Philippines constabulary, the ROKA developed into a formidable and technically competent force. It was also renowned for its brutality, however, and became a springboard to political power, thus hindering democratic development.

&ldquoThe Gooks Only Understood Force&rdquo: The Evolution of a Police State

Throughout the late 1940s, South Korea resembled what political adviser H. Merrell Benninghoff referred to as a &ldquopowder keg ready to explode.&rdquo An AMG poll revealed that 49 percent of the population preferred the Japanese occupation to the American &ldquoliberation.&rdquo 19 Korea had both a tradition of radicalism and the oldest Communist Party in Asia, with experienced leaders who had led the struggle against Japan. While food imports and public health initiatives brought some benefits, land inequalities, poverty, and the desire for unification with the North made circumstances ripe for revolution, as did official corruption and heavy-handed rice collection policies enforced by the KNP. Hodge wrote in a memo that &ldquoany talk of freedom was purely academic&rdquo and that the situation left &ldquofertile ground for the spread of communism.&rdquo 20

In a February 1949 study the State Department noted, &ldquoLabor, social security, land reform, and sex equality laws have been popular in the North and appeal to South Koreans as well.&rdquo Emphasizing that although increased regimentation, heavy taxes, and the elimination of individual entrepreneurship were sowing the seeds of discontent, the northern regime still enjoyed greater popularity than that of the South because it &ldquogave a large segment of the population the feeling of participation in government&rdquo that was absent in the South. 21 This document acknowledged the lack of popular legitimacy of the southern regime, recognizing that it could survive only through force.

Resistance was led by labor and farmers&rsquo associations and People&rsquos Committees, which organized democratic governance and social reform at the local level. The mass-based South Korean Labor Party (SKLP), headed by Pak Hon-Yong, a veteran of anti-Japanese protest with communist ties, led strikes and carried out acts of industrial sabotage, eventually becoming infiltrated by agents of the U.S. Army Counter-Intelligence corps (CIC). 22 Trained in sophisticated methods of information gathering and population control, the KNP maintained an &ldquoobservation section&rdquo focused on political activity, which provided information to U.S. intelligence and at times even spied on Americans. (Ambassador John Muccio reported that the Pusan embassy was under constant surveillance by &ldquolittle men with notebooks.&rdquo) With government authorities accusing almost anyone opposed to their policies of being communists and traitors, police raided homes, arrested newspaper editors for printing &ldquoinflammatory articles,&rdquo and intimidated voters during fraudulent elections, including the one in May 1948 that brought Rhee to power. In the countryside, they extracted rice from the peasantry &ldquothe same way as under the Japanese except with worse treatment,&rdquo and in cities jailed student and labor leaders and even school teachers for merely mentioning communism in their classrooms. 23

Syngman Rhee with John Muccio

Once in custody, suspects were tortured through such methods as kidney punching, hanging by the thumbnails, forced eating of hot peppers, and electroshocks in the attempt to extract confessions. A standard entry in the police registry was &ldquodied under torture&rdquo and &ldquodied of heart failure.&rdquo One prison report referred to a young girl whose face was covered because she had been struck with a rifle butt and another a man who had gone deaf from beatings. Some KNP units morphed into death squads (such as the &ldquoBlack Tiger Gang,&rdquo headed by Chang T&rsquoaek-sang) and assassinated opposition figures, including, it is alleged, Yo Un-Hyong, a nationalist who promoted reconciliation between North and South. 24 American military commanders often promoted brutal tactics. CIC agent Donald Nichol reported in his memoirs that the KNP were advised to &ldquodump [untrustworthy agents] off the back of a boat, in the nude, at high speed or give him false information plants&mdashand let the enemy do it for you.&rdquo

Despite attempts to develop professionalism, salaries were so inadequate, according to one army report, that police were &ldquoforced to beg, buy, or steal other items besides rice which go with the making of a regular diet.&rdquoAnother report stated that the KNP &ldquolacked enthusiasm&rdquo in cooperating with the army&rsquos Criminal Investigation Division in halting the illicit sale of scrap metal and other American products, as they &ldquooften took a share of the cut.&rdquo 25 American relations with Korean officials were marred by mutual mistrust. Police adviser David Fay told General Albert Wedemeyer that in his province, &ldquonot one problem of police administration had been presented to the Americans for discussion.&rdquo 26

In July 1946, Captain Richard D. Robinson, assistant head of the AMG&rsquos Bureau of Public Opinion, conducted an investigation which found police to be &ldquoextremely harsh&rdquo and intimidation such that people were afraid

to talk to Americans. Believing that oppressive methods were driving moderates into the communist camp, Robinson was outraged when he witnessed Wu Han Chai, a former machine gunner in the Japanese army, using the &ldquowater treatment&rdquo to get a suspected pickpocket to confess and had his arms forced back by means of a stock inserted behind his back and in the crooks of his elbow. When confronted, Wu said he did not believe he had done anything wrong, which appeared to Robinson to reflect a deficiency in his training. Robinson was later threatened with court-martial by Hodge&rsquos assistant, General Archer Lerch, and was harassed by the FBI, examples of the military&rsquos attempt to silence internal critics. 27

In October 1946, at a conference to address public grievances, witnesses testified that the KNP was bayoneting students and extorting from peasants in the administration of grain collection. Due process, they said, was rarely abided by, and warrants were rarely issued. Police looted and robbed the homes of leftists and used money gained from shakedowns to entertain themselves in &ldquoKisaeng houses&rdquo and fancy drinking and eating establishments. The head of the youth section of the Farmers&rsquo Guild in Ka Pyung testified that he had been arrested in the middle of the night and held in a dirty cell for five days. Other leftists, including juveniles and women, spoke about being beaten to the point where gangrene set in and pus seeped out of their legs. Cho Sing Chik of Sung-Ju recounted his experience under detention of seeing a roomful of people who had been crippled by mistreatment. He stated that many of the worst abuses were committed by firemen organized into an emergency committee to support the police and collect money for them. &ldquoThe police not being able to themselves beat the people turn them over to the firemen and the firemen work on them,&rdquo he declared. Another witness testified that the police were &ldquoworse than under the Japanese who were afraid to do such things [as torture]. . . . Now they have no respect for their superiors.&rdquo 28

Director Chough Pyong-Ok, a Columbia University Ph.D. who made an estimated 20 million yen (about $200,000) in bribes during the first two years of the occupation, admitted that the KNP were &ldquopartial to the ideas of the rightists,&rdquo though he insisted that &ldquoall those arrested have committed actual crimes.&rdquo The CIA reported in 1948, however, that the police were taking action against known or suspected communists &ldquowithout recourse to judicial process.&rdquoStressing the importance of speedy court procedure and judicial reform in strengthening the legitimacy of the police, Robinson recommended to Hodge that he remove those who had held the rank of lieutenant under the Japanese and whose actions were &ldquoincompatible with the . . . principles of democracy in the police system.&rdquo 29

Roger Baldwin, a founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, set up a branch in Korea in the attempt to abolish torture. The exigencies of maintaining power and destroying social subversion from below, however, took precedence. Pak Wan-so,a South Korean writer who had been imprisoned and tortured by the police, charged: &ldquoThey called me a red bitch. Any red was not considered human. . . .They looked at me as if I was a beast or a bug. . . . Because we weren&rsquot human, we had no rights.&rdquo 30

The KNP maintained a symbiotic relationship with right-wing vigilantes, whose headquarters were located next to or inside police stations. They were described by the journalist Mark Gayn as resembling &ldquoHollywood underworld

killers.&rdquo Their ranks were swelled by an influx of Northern refugees bearing deep grievances against communism. Chang T&rsquoaek Sang, who became prime minister, was on the board of the National Youth Association, which the CIA

characterized as a &ldquoterrorist group in support of extreme right-wing politicians.&rdquo Its head, Yi Pom Sok, was a Dai Li protégé and OSS liaison recruited in 1945 by Paul Helliwell and William Donovan of the OSS. Later appointed as defense minister, Yi received $333,000 in equipment and assistance from Colonel Ernest Voss of the internal security department to set up a &ldquoleadership academy&rdquo with courses in combating strikes and the history of the Hitler jugend (Hitler Youth), whom Yi admired. 31 Opposed to the very idea of a labor union, his men beat leftists and conducted surveillance and forays across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, with CIC support. There were even attempts to assassinate Kim Il Sung. 32

In the rare instances when right-wing paramilitaries were prosecuted, they were often given red carpet treatment. In May 1946 in Taejon, for example, fourteen rightists were arrested after attacking suspected communists and

stealing rice from farmers. While taking them to court, KNP officers stopped at the house of one of the prisoners and, according to internal records, enjoyed a &ldquodrunken picnic&rdquo arranged by relatives of the prisoners. In another case, the rightist gangster Kim Tu-han got off with a small fine for torturing to death two leftist youth association members and seriously injuring eight others (one of whom was emasculated). At the trial, the judge refused to call as witnesses counterintelligence officers who had taken photographs and supervised the autopsies. Such double standards were generally supported by American authorities owing to larger power considerations. 33

According to information officer John Caldwell, who was ardently anticommunist and pro-Rhee, a majority of the Americans in Korea operated under the premise that &ldquothe &lsquogooks&rsquo only understood force,&rdquo a key factor accounting for the embrace of repressive methods. 34 A 1948 report by the lawyers Roy C. Stiles and Albert Lyman on the administration of justice asserted that &ldquoacts considered to be cruel by western standards were only part of the tested oriental modus operandi. Low evaluation of life results in the acceptance of human cruelty.&rdquo Police adviser Robert Ferguson, a beat cop from St. Louis, commented, &ldquoOrientals are accustomed to brutality such as would disgust a white man.&rdquo Yet another report remarked that, &ldquoconcepts of individual rights were incomprehensible to the oriental.

It would take much vigorous training backed by prompt punishment to change their thinking.&rdquo 35 Such comments illustrate the racism that underlay the trampling of civil liberties and undermining of the progressive policing model.

In February 1948 the State Department produced a report, &ldquoSouthern Korea: A Police State?&rdquo acknowledging that the KNP had a well-known &ldquorightist bias,&rdquowhich led police to assume the function of a political force for the suppression of leftist elements. Although the authors admitted that the &ldquocharges that the U.S. is maintaining a police state through its military government is not subject to flat refutation,&rdquo they held that the police programs sought to inculcate democratic principles, which are &ldquothe antithesis of a police state.&rdquo Native agencies, however, were not able to &ldquoachieve a full understanding of these principles,&rdquo owing to a &ldquoheritage of Japanese oppression&rdquo and &ldquothe fact of occupation&mdashthe excesses, disorders, and growing pains accompanying the development of a self-governing society.&rdquo 36 These remarks provide a striking admission of the lack of democratic standards and illustrate the kinds of arguments adopted by public officials to absolve themselves of responsibility for the unfolding violence in the ROK.

&ldquoWe&rsquore Having a Civil War Down Here&rdquo: The October 1946 Revolts and Prison Overcrowding

According to the U.S. Army&rsquos official history of the Korean occupation, the &ldquopublic&rsquos ill feeling toward the police, which police abuse had engendered, became a potent factor in the riots and quasi-revolts which swept South Korea

in October 1946.&rdquo 37 In South Cholla province, after the KNP killed a labor leader, Njug Ju Myun, and jailed unemployed coal miners celebrating the first anniversary of Korea&rsquos liberation from Japan, angry peasants dynamited a police box and ambushed a prisoner convoy by throwing stones. Constabulary detachments hunted those deemed responsible with the assistance of American troops, firing into crowds. Hundreds died or were injured. An editorial proclaimed: &ldquoWe cannot take the humiliation any longer and must fight against imperialism and the barbarity of the U.S. Army. . . . In North Korea, Japanese exploitation was abolished and land was given back to the people through the agrarian and labor laws. In South Korea, the property of the Japanese imperialists was taken over by the Americans and Korean reactionary elements. . . . The people are suffering from oppression and exploitation. This is democracy?&rdquo 38

Such sentiments lay at the root of mounting civil strife across the country, to which authorities responded the only way they knew how&mdashwith further police repression and violence. In Taegu, martial law was declared after riots

precipitated by police suppression of a railroad strike left thirty-nine civilians dead, hundreds wounded, and thirty-eight missing. Fifteen hundred were arrested, and forty were given death sentences, including SKLP leader Pak, who fled to the North. Over 100,000 students walked out in solidarity with the workers, while mobs ransacked police posts, buried officers alive, and slashed the face of the police chief, in a pattern replicated in neighboring cities and

towns. (In Waegwon, rioters cut the police chief&rsquos eyes and tongue.) 39 Blaming the violence on &ldquooutside agitators&rdquo (none were ever found) and the &ldquoidiocy&rdquo of the peasants, the American military called in reinforcements to restore order. Colonel Raymond G. Peeke proclaimed, &ldquoWe&rsquore having a civil war down here.&rdquo The director of the army&rsquos Department of Transportation added: &ldquoWe had a battle mentality. We didn&rsquot have to worry too much if innocent people got hurt. We set up concentration camps outside of town and held strikers there when the jails got too full. . . . It was war. We recognized it as war and fought it as such.&rdquo 40

By mid-1947, after the AMG passed a national security law expanding police powers, there were almost 22,000 people in jail, nearly twice as many as under the Japanese. KNP director William Maglin later acknowledged in a

1999 article that &ldquoin their retaliation for murders and indignities [during the 1946 riots] police went too far in arresting large numbers of communists, leftists, and leftist sympathizers.&rdquo Many were sentenced by military tribunal, while others languished in prison without counsel. Thousands were held in outlying camps, including seven members of the National Assembly charged with leading a &ldquocommunist conspiracy.&rdquo 41

During an inspection of Wanju jail, Captain Richard D. Robinson found six prisoners sharing a mosquito-infested twelve-foot-by-twelve-foot cell accessible only through a small trapdoor and tunnel. In other facilities, inmates were beaten and stripped naked to keep them from committing suicide. The latrine was usually nothing but a hole in the floor. Food was inadequate, winter temperatures were sub-zero, and medical care was scant. Prisoners were not allowed to write letters or have outside communications and usually had to sleep standing up. In Suwan, inmates were forced to sleep in pit cells without heat. Their water was drawn from a well located next to a depository for raw sewage, causing rampant disease, including a scabies epidemic. 42

In April 1948, to relieve overcrowding, Major William F. Dean, a onetime Berkeley patrolman, recommended the release of 3,140 political prisoners whose offense consisted only of &ldquoparticipation in illegal meetings and demonstrations and distributing handbills.&rdquo 43 Authorities established work camps in order to &ldquoutilize the capabilities of the inmates in useful occupations,&rdquo which often entailed performing duties for the American military. Enacting the ideals of the progressive movement, U.S. advisers introduced vocational training, a rewards system, prison industries, and movies and recreation. They brought in chaplains, constructed juvenile facilities, and established a guard training school with courses in modern penology, fingerprinting, and weapons. 44

What effect the reforms had is unclear what is certain is that prisons remained riddled with abuse. According to the U.S. Army, guards displayed a &ldquoharshness that was repugnant to Department of Justice legal advisers.&rdquo At the Inchon Boys&rsquo Prison, inmates were deprived of exercise and forced to work at making straw rope without sufficient light. Prisoners engaged in hunger strikes and led jail breaks. In Kwangju on August 31, 1947, 172 inmates overpowered guards, and seven drilled their way to freedom. Two years later in Mokpo, near Seoul, 237 guerrillas from Cheju Island were killed by police and U.S. Army soldiers after breaking free into the neighboring hills another eighty-five were captured alive. 45 In sum, the prison conditions contradict the myth that the American influence in South Korea was benign. As in later interventions, the repressive climate catalyzed the opposition and hastened armed resistance.

&ldquoA Cloud of Terror&rdquo: The Cheju Massacre and Korean War Atrocities

Some of the worst police crimes occurred in suppressing the uprising on the island of Cheju at the southern tip of the country. The source of the upheaval was unequal land distribution and police brutality, as the CIA acknowledged. Hodge ironically told a group of congressmen that Cheju was a truly&ldquocommunal area . . . peacefully controlled by the People&rsquos Committee,&rdquo who promoted a collectivist and socialist philosophy &ldquowithout much Comintern influence.&rdquo 46 In March 1947, as the AMG tried to assert its authority, the KNP fired into a crowd and killed eight peaceful demonstrators, then imprisoned another four hundred. Governor Pak Kyong-jun was dismissed and replaced by Yu Hae-jin, an extreme rightist described as &ldquoruthless and dictatorial in his dealing with the opposing political parties. 47 KNP units and right-wing youth groups terrorized the People&rsquos Committee and cut off the flow of food and construction supplies, turning the island into an open-air prison. In response, the Cheju branch of the SKLP, long known for its anticolonial defiance, established guerrilla units in the Halla Mountains supported by an estimated 80 percent of the population. 48 In April 1948 the rebellion spread to the west coast of the island, where guerrillas attacked twenty-four police stations. KNP and constabulary units operating under U.S. military commandand aided by aerial reinforcements and spy planes swept the mountains, waging &ldquoan all-out guerrilla extermination campaign,&rdquo as Everett Drumwright of the American embassy characterized it, massacring people with bamboo spears and torching homes. One report stated, &ldquoFrustrated by not knowing the identity of these elusive men [the guerrillas], the police in some cases carried out indiscriminate warfare against entire villages.&rdquo Between 30,000 and 60,000 people were killed out of a population of 300,000, including the guerrilla leader Yi Tôk-ku, and another 40,000 were exiled. 49

Police atrocities in the suppression of the insurrection in Yosu left that port town in ashes. After the declaration of martial law on October 22, 1948, constabulary units under Captain James Hausman rounded up suspected rebels, stripped them to their underwear in schoolyards, and beat them with bars, iron chains, and rifle butts. Cursory screenings were undertaken, and several thousand were executed in plain sight of their wives and children in revenge for attacks on police stations. The corpses of many of the dead were placed in city streets with a red hammer and sickle insignia covering the chest. Order was restored only after purges were conducted in constabulary regiments that had mutinied in support of the rebel cause, and the perpetrators executed by firing squad. 50

The Yosu and Cheju massacres contributed to the decimation of the leftist movements, which deprived Kim Il-Sung&rsquos armies of support after crossing into South Korea on June 25, 1950, precipitating the Korean War. When fighting broke out, the KNP, expanded to seventy thousand men, joined in combat operations, later receiving decorations for &ldquoruthless campaigns against guerrilla forces.&rdquo Many officers were recruited for secret missions into North Korea by the CIA&rsquos Seoul station chief, Albert Haney, a key architect of the 1290-d program, and Hans Tofte, a hero of the Danish underground who later served under OPS cover in Colombia. A large number were killed, owing to the infiltration of the secret teams by double agents, though Haney doctored the intelligence reports to cover up their fate. 51

In the summer of 1950, to keep Southern leftists from reinforcing the Northerners, KNP and ROKA units emptied the prisons and shot as many as 100,000 detainees, dumping the bodies into hastily dug trenches, abandoned mines, or the sea. According to archival revelations and the findings of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, women and children were among those killed. 52 The British journalist James Cameron encountered prisoners on their way to execution only yards from U.S. Army headquarters and five minutes from the UN Commission building in Pusan. &ldquoThey were skeletons and they cringed like dogs,&rdquo he wrote. &ldquoThey were manacled with chains and . . . compelled to crouch in the classical Oriental attitude of subjection. Sometimes they moved enough to scoop a handful of water from the black puddles around them . . . . Any deviation . . . brought a gun to their heads.&rdquo 53

The most concentrated killing occurred in the city of Taejon, where the KNP slaughtered thousands of leftists under American oversight. Official histories long tried to pin the atrocity on the communists. The conduct of the KNP was

not an aberration, however, but the result of ideological conditioning, training in violent counterinsurgency methods by the Americans and Japanese, and the breakdown of social mores in the war. H istorian Kim Dong- Choon described the police killings represented among the &ldquomost tragic and brutal chapters&rdquo of a conflict that claimed the lives of 3 million people and left millions more as refugees. 54

Managing the Counterrevolution: Police Training and &ldquoNation-Building&rdquo in South Korea in the War&rsquos Aftermath

OPS adviser Robert N. Bush and South Korean Counterpart. Courtesy Sgt. Gary Wilkerson, Indiana State Police.

The Korean War ended in stalemate in 1953. Syngman Rhee remained leader of the ROK until his death in 1960, when, after a brief power struggle, he was replaced by General Park Chung Hee. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, American policy elites conceived of South Korea as a laboratory for the promotion of free-market capitalism and modernizing reforms. 55

Operating on a budget of $900,000 per year, police programs were designed to wipe out the last vestiges of guerrilla resistance and promote the stability on which economic development could take root. Concerned about police corruption and outdated technical equipment, the CIA noted that South Korea had emerged from the war with a &ldquorigid anti-communist national attitude and vigilant . . . repressive internal security system . . . which has resulted in the virtual elimination of all but the most covert and clandestine communist operators.&rdquo 56 Various revenge regiments were in existence, whose mission was to hunt down Northern collaborators. American training focused on building up espionage and &ldquocounter-subversive&rdquo capabilities, creating a central records system, and lecturing on the severity of the &ldquocommunist threat.&rdquo U.S. military advisers oversaw police units carrying out &ldquomop-up&rdquo (death squad) operations against &ldquobandits&rdquo and spies, in which civilian deaths were widely reported. In a precursor to the Vietnam Phoenix program, efficiency was measured by the number of weapons seized and guerrillas captured and &ldquoannihilated,&rdquo usually at least four times more than the number of police wounded or killed. 57

Typical was a report in February 1954 in which adviser Edward J. Classon lauded the discovery and destruction of an enemy hideout in Sonam in which thirty-one &ldquobandits&rdquo were killed and fifty-four captured. 58 Another report referred to a police drive in December 1953, Operation Trample, which &ldquoreduced the number of &lsquobandits&rsquo from 691 to only 131 [in the Southern Security Command],&rdquo the remainder of whom were now &ldquowidely scattered&rdquo and &ldquorepresented little danger to the population.&rdquo 59

In the face of repression and waning support among a war-weary population, guerrillas resorted to kidnapping and extortion in an attempt to survive. A police report dated May 1, 1954, noted that five &ldquobandits&rdquo under the cover of darkness raided the homes of two farmers, tied up their families, and demanded millet, salt, potatoes, and clothing, which gives a good sense of their desperation. 60 In December 1956, public authorities announced the success of pacification efforts. They claimed to have arrested the last known &ldquoguerilla bandits&rdquo of the anti-American regiment, a seventeen-year-old girl, Koon Ja Kim, and eighteen-year-old Sam Jin Koh, in a mop-up campaign in Chullo-Pukto province. Seven subversives were shot, including commander Kaun Soo Pak, age thirty-three. The photos of Koon and Sam under police arrest were broadcast in the Korea Times in order to publicize the KNP&rsquos strength in reestablishing law and order. 61

Throughout the duration of Rhee&rsquos rule, the police remained mobilized for paramilitary operations. Interference in elections and ballot stuffing remained prevalent, as did customary practices such as surveillance, black propaganda, and torture. 62 Rhee used the police to undertake &ldquoextralegal and violent tactics&rdquo against opponents. In April 1960, police opened fire on student demonstrators protesting the recent fraudulent elections, killing or wounding several hundred. Koreans in the United States picketed the White House, demanding that America take a stand against &ldquothe brutal, degrading butchery.&rdquo 63

The Korea Times reported on the arrest and beating of Kim Sun-Tae, an MP, after he protested staged elections in 1956. Lee Ik-Heung, minister of home affairs, and Kim Chong-Won, head of the public security bureau, who worked closely with Captain Warren S. Olin, a career army officer, ordered troopers to &ldquonab the bastard&rdquo and kept him in detention for five days, during which time he was &ldquotreated like a dog.&rdquo The newspaper editorialized, &ldquoThere can never be a representative democracy with men like Lee and Kim in positions of power.&rdquo 64 Born to a poor Korean family in Japan, Kim Chong-Won was trained in the 1930s in Japanese military academies, whose rigorous ideological conditioning and harsh, dehumanizing methods set the course for his career. Known as the &ldquoPaektu Mountain Tiger,&rdquo he decapitated suspected guerrilla collaborators during the suppression of the Yosu rebellion with a Japanese-style sword and machine gunned thirty-one detainees in the Yongdok police station. In Yonghaemyon, Kim&rsquos men arrested civilians after finding propaganda leaflets at a nearby school and shot them in front of villagers, opening fire on women and children who ran from the scene. Over five hundred were killed in the massacre, for which Kim was sentenced to three years in prison, though he was amnestied by Rhee. 65

&ldquoTiger&rdquo Kim presided over further atrocities as vice commander of the military police in Pusan during the Korean War. His appointment as head of the public security bureau was a reward for his loyalty to Rhee and reflected the KNP&rsquos continued emphasis on counterinsurgency and utter disregard for human rights. Ambassador John Muccio, who later oversaw another dirty war in Guatemala, characterized Kim&rsquos methods as &ldquoruthless yet effective,&rdquo typifying U.S. support for brutal tactics, as long as they were directed against &ldquocommunists.&rdquo 66

Police Chief Chang Taek-sang with a man who may be Tiger Kim (left)

Viewing the police programs as a great success, the State Department sought to replicate them in Vietnam, where the U.S. and the French faced a similar problem of communist infiltration and an &ldquoinability to distinguish friend from foe.&rdquo Colonel Albert Haney, in his internal outline of the 1290-d program, boasted that &ldquoU.S efforts behind the ROK in subduing communist guerrillas in South Korea, while not generally known, were exceptionally effective at a time when the French were spectacularly ineffective in Indochina.&rdquoOn May 27, 1954, Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Milon of the French army was briefed by American officials on KNP techniques of surveillance and population control,, which he sought to incorporate as a model. 67

In 1955, after transferring police training to the State Department under 1290-d, the Eisenhower administration provided over $1 million in equipment to the KNP. Lauren &ldquoJack&rdquo Goin, an air force officer with B.A. and M.S. degrees in criminology from the University of California at Berkeley and director of the Allegheny Crime Lab in Pittsburgh, set up a scientific crime lab equipped with fingerprinting powders and the latest forensic technology. (He later did the same in Vietnam, Indonesia, Dominican Republic, and Brazil.) 68 Advisers from Michigan State University&rsquos Vietnam project, including Jack Ryan, Ralph Turner, and Howard Hoyt, served as consultants and helped set up a communication system. They then went on to Taipei, where, on a visit sponsored by the CIA-fronted Asia Foundation, they instructed police led by the Generalissimo&rsquos son Chiang Ching-kuo in rooting out Maoist infiltration. 69

The 1290-d police training program in South Korea was headed by Ray Foreaker, retired chief of police in Oakland, and a twenty-seven-year veteran of the Berkeley police force, where he had been mentored by August Vollmer, the &ldquofather of modern law enforcement.&rdquo During his tenure as Berkeley chief, Vollmer pioneered many innovations, including the use of fingerprinting, patrol cars, and lie detector tests. A veteran of the Spanish-American War who cut his teeth training police in Manila, Vollmer was more liberal than many of his contemporaries in defending communists&rsquo right to free assembly and speech and in criticizing drug prohibition laws. He worked to curtail the &ldquothird degree&rdquo and embraced a social work approach to policing, visiting local jails each morning to talk to inmates and urging his officers to interact with members of the community on their beat. 70

Apart from in his attitude toward communism, these are the kinds of ideals that Foreaker, a specialist in criminal and security investigations, sought to promote in South Korea, and later in Indonesia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Vietnam. He commented, &ldquoOur work here [in the 1290-d program] is in the total field of public safety rather than in police work alone.&rdquo 71 Foreaker&rsquos successor as Oakland police chief, Wyman W. Vernon, was part of the advisory team, later serving in Vietnam and Pakistan. Like Foreaker, he had a reputation as an incorruptible reformer, having established a special planning and research unit in Oakland staffed by Berkeley students to analyze and address police problems, including poor relations with minorities. The Oakland police nevertheless continued to be viewed as an army of occupation in the black community, their brutalization of antiwar demonstrators and Black Panthers during the 1960s exemplifying the limits of the Berkeley professionalization model. 72 Shaped by the conservative, hierarchical, and lily-white institutional milieu from which they came, Foreaker and Vernon were generally ill-equipped to bring about enlightened police practice in South Korea, where they faced an alien cultural environment and a war climate that brought out the most violent tendencies of the police.

In the attempt to instill greater professionalism, the State Department sent twenty top-ranking KNP, including General Hak Sung Wang, head of the national police college, and Chi Hwan Choi, chief of the uniformed police, trained by the Americans in the 1940s, for courses at the FBI Academy and at leading criminology institutes such as Berkeley, Michigan State University, and the Northwestern Traffic Institute. 73 A dozen more were sent to the Los Angeles Police Department, headed by Chief Willie Parker (1950&ndash1966), who was known for cleaning up corruption and for his right-wing politics and insensitivity toward racial minorities and the poor. 74

Arthur Thurston, CIA, OPS

Korean officers trained in prison management at George Washington University returned home to reform the ROK penal system. Drawing on the ideals of progressive penology, they revived efforts to establish rewards and parole, promoted industrial training, and created juvenile reformatories to address skyrocketing delinquency rates resulting from a profusion of war orphans. The PSD pledged $553,688 and assisted in developing a work farm outside Seoul based on the Boys Town juvenile detention center in Nebraska. 75

Coinciding with the passage of mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses in the United States, the International Cooperation Administration established police counter-narcotics units, which raided opium dens and launched Operation Poppy, deploying army aviation units to detect and destroy poppy fields. 76 These campaigns were undermined by police and governmental corruption. A report from the U.S. Army&rsquos Criminal Investigation Division pointed to ties between Japanese gangster Machii Hisayuki (known in Korea as Ko Yung Mok) and ROK naval intelligence, stating that he was &ldquotoo strong politically to be touched by the police,&rdquo despite having murdered a Korean boxer. American troops also participated in the black market, working with their Korean girlfriends and local &ldquoslickie&rdquo boys to sell drugs, cigarettes, and pirated consumer goods such as watches, cameras, and radios. 77 Their involvement in crimes, including vehicular manslaughter, arson, rape, and murder, dominate police reports of the period. 78

In the late 1950s, the State Department suspended the police programs, acknowledging their contribution to widespread human rights violations. The United States was integral in creating a repressive internal security apparatus that made even hardened Cold Warriors blanch. A 1961 cabinet-level report tellingly referred to the KNP as the &ldquohated instrument of the Rhee regime.&rdquo 79 The Kennedy administration nevertheless revived police training under Rhee&rsquos successor, Park Chung Hee, a former member of the South Korean Communist Party who later hunted Korean resistance fighters in Manchuria during World War II with the Japanese Imperial Army. After mutinying during the 1948 Yosu rebellion, General Park escaped execution by informing on onetime associates, allegedly including his own brother, and subsequently rose through the military hierarchy with the assistance of Captain Hausman, who remained in country as a liaison with the ROKA. After the 1961 coup in which Park seized power, he presided over a period of spectacular economic growth, resulting from visionary state planning, technological development, war profiteering, and a massive interjection of foreign capital. 80 The ROK Supreme Council meanwhile passed a law mandating the purification of political activities. Living conditions remained difficult for the majority, as Park collaborated with the management of large chaebol (conglomerates) in using police and hired goons to suppress strikes, and keeping wages low in order to attract foreign investment. Forbes magazine glowingly promoted South Korea in this period as a great place to do business because laborers worked sixty hours per week for very low pay. 81

Frank Jessup, OPS Director South Korea

Characterized as a quasi-military force, the KNP retained a crucial role in suppressing working-class mobilization and monitoring political activity. Surveillance was coordinated with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency which was developed out of police intelligence units trained by the United States. OPS advisers in the CIA&mdashincluding Arthur M. Thurston, who left his official job as chairman of the board of the Farmers National Bank in Shelbyville, Indiana, for months at a time, telling friends and family he was going to Europe&mdashhelped set up intelligence schools and a situation room facility equipped with maps and telecommunications equipment. By the mid-1960s, Korean Central Intelligence had 350,000 agents, out of a population of 30 million, dwarfing the Russian NKVD at its height. CIA attaché Peer De Silva rationalized its ruthless methods by claiming, &ldquoThere are tigers roaming the world, and we must recognize this or perish.&rdquo 82

From 1967 to 1970 the OPS team in Korea was headed by Frank Jessup, a Republican appointee as superintendent of the Indiana State Police in the mid- 1950s and veteran of police programs in Greece, Liberia, Guatemala, and Iran. A sergeant with the Marine Corps Third Division who served in counterintelligence during the Pacific war and as chief of civil defense with the U.S. federal police, Jessup was a national officer of the American Legion. Lacking any real knowledge of Korean affairs, he subscribed to the worldview of the American New Right, with its commitment to social order, military preparedness, and counterrevolutionary activism at home and abroad. His politics were characteristic of the advisory group, which included William J. Simmler, chief of detectives in Philadelphia, with experience in the Philippines Peter Costello, a twenty-four-year veteran of the New York Police Department, who helped run the dirty war in Guatemala and Harold &ldquoScotty&rdquo Caplan of the Pennsylvania State Police.

Peaking at a budget of $5.3 million in 1968, the OPS organized combat police brigades and village surveillance and oversaw the interrogation of captured agents and defectors. It also improved record management, trained industrial

security guards, oversaw the delivery of 886 vehicles (35 percent of the KNP fleet), and provided polygraph machines and weaponry such as gas masks and grenade launchers. 83 The KNP claimed to have apprehended 80 percent of North Korean infiltrators as a result of American assistance. 84

Sweeping under the rug the tyrannical aspects of Park&rsquos rule, modernization theorists in Washington considered U.S. policy in South Korea to be a phenomenal success because of the scale of economic growth, which was contingent in part on manufacturing vital equipment for the American army in Vietnam. The United States was especially grateful to Park for sending 312,000 ROK soldiers to Vietnam, where they committed dozens of My Lai&ndashstyle massacres and, according to a RAND Corporation study, burned, destroyed, and killed anyone who stood in their path. 85 The participation of police in domestic surveillance and acts of state terrorism was justified as creating a climate of stability, allowing for economic &ldquotake-off.&rdquo Together with Japan, South Korea helped crystallize the view that a nation&rsquos police force was the critical factor needed to provide for its internal defense. 86

South Korean police arrest protestors during the Kwangju incident in 1980

In January 1974, President Park passed an emergency measure giving him untrammeled power to crack down on dissenters. Amnesty International subsequently reported an appalling record of police detentions, beatings, and torture of journalists, churchmen, academics, and other regime opponents. Leftists (dubbed chwaiksu) confined in overcrowded prisons were forced to wear red badges and received the harshest treatment. 87 In May 1980, KNP and

ROKA officers, a number of them Vietnam War veterans, killed up to three thousand people in suppressing the Kwangju pro-democracy uprising. Students were burned alive with flamethrowers as the officers laid siege to the city. A popular slogan from the period proclaimed, &ldquoEven the Japanese police officers and the communists during the Korean War weren&rsquot this cruel.&rdquo These words provide a fitting epitaph to the American police programs, which, over a thirty-five-year period, trained some of the forces implicated in the massacre and provided the KNP with modern weaponry and equipment used for repressive ends. 88

Police at Kwangju

In a study of police torturers in the Southern Cone of Latin America, Martha K. Huggins and a team of researchers concluded that ideological conditioning and the political climate of the Cold War helped shape their behavior and allowed for the rationalization of actions that the perpetrators would normally have considered abhorrent, and now do in the clear light of day. 89 Their insights are equally applicable to South Korea, where police violence was justified as saving the country from a dangerous enemy. Conceiving of police as crucial to broader state-building efforts, the American programs were designed in theory to professionalize police standards and incorporate the kinds of progressive style reforms that were prevalent in the United States. However, they became heavily militarized and focused on the suppression of left-wing activism, resulting in systematic human rights violations. American intervention empowered authoritarian leaders and provided security forces with modern surveillance equipment, forensics technology, and weapons which heightened their social control capabilities. The vibrancy of the labor movement and political left was curtailed, thus contributing to a weakening of civil society. The working classes were largely left out of the Park-era economic boom, and North-South rapprochement was made impossible. Throughout the Cold War, challengers of the status quo were subjected to imprisonment, torture, and often death. Their plight has largely been suppressed in the West, along with the buried history of U.S.-ROK atrocities in the Korean War. Undisturbed by all the bloodshed, the practitioners of realpolitik in Washington viewed the intervention in South Korea as an effective application of the containment doctrine. Police advisers were consequently called upon to pass along their technical expertise so as to fend off revolution in other locales, including South Vietnam, again with cataclysmic results.

This is a revised and expanded version of chapter four in Modernizing Repression.

Recommended Citation: Jeremy Kuzmarov, " Police Training, 'Nation-Building,' and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 27, No. 3, July 2, 2012.

1 MacArthur quoted in John Dower, &ldquoThe U.S.-Japan Military Relationship,&rdquo in Postwar Japan, 1945 to the Present, ed. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather (New York: Pantheon, 1973), 236. On the long-standing U.S. drive for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, see Bruce Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). For strategic planning after World War II, see Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York: New Press, 2003).

2 See Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America&rsquos Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009) Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: vol. 2 , The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947&ndash1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 31.

3 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945&ndash1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) &ldquoThe Position of the U.S. with Respect toKorea,&rdquo National Security Council Report 8, April 2, 1948, PSF, Truman Papers, HSTL.

4 Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon,1988), 23 Dong-Choon Kim, The Unending Korean War: A Social History, trans. Sung-ok Kim (Larkspur, Calif.: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), 80. When asked by the journalist Mark Gayn whether Rhee was a fascist, Lieutenant Leonard Bertsch, an adviser to General John R. Hodge, head of the American occupation, responded, &ldquoHe is two centuries before fascism&mdasha true Bourbon.&rdquo Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: William Sloane, 1948),352.

5 Bruce Cumings, Korea&rsquos Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997), 210.

6 &ldquoA History of the Korean National Police (KNP),&rdquo August 7, 1948, RG 554, United States Army Forces in Korea, Records

Regarding the Okinawa Campaign (1945&ndash1948), United States Military Government, Korean Political Affairs, box 25 (hereafter USAFKIK, Okinawa).

7 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947&ndash1950, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 186, 187 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 143.

8 Roy C. Stiles and Albert Lyman, &ldquoThe Administration of Justice in Korea under the Japanese and in South Korea under the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea to August 15, 1958: Paper by American Advisory Staff,&rdquo Department of Justice, RDS, Records Related to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1945&ndash1949, decimal file 895 (hereafter cited RDS, Korea.

9 Harry Maglin, &ldquoOrganization of National Police of Korea,&rdquo December 27, 1945, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 Everett F. Drumright to Secretary of State, &ldquoFBI Training,&rdquo December 22, 1948, RDS, Korea Philip H. Taylor, &ldquoMilitary Government Experience in Korea,&rdquo in American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, ed. Carl J. Friederich (New York:

Rinehart, 1948), 377 Harold Larsen, U.S. Army History of the United States Armed Forcesin Korea, pt. 3, chap. 4, &ldquoPolice and Public Security&rdquo (Seoul and Tokyo, manuscript in theOffice of the Chief of Military History, 1947&ndash48).

10 Gayn, Japan Diary, 390 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:164 Col. William H. Maglin, &ldquoLooking Back in History: . . . The Korean National Police&rdquo Military Police Professional Bulletin (Winter 1999): 67&ndash69 John Muccio to Secretary of State, August 13, 1949, Department of Justice, RDS, Korea. Ch&rsquooe Nûng-jin (&ldquoDanny Choy&rdquo), chief of the KNP Detective Bureau, called the KNP &ldquothe refuge home for Japanese-trained police and traitors,&rdquo including &ldquocorrupt police who were chased out of North Korea by the communists.&rdquoCumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:166, 167. In North Korea, by contrast, police officers during the colonial period were purged, and authorities worked to rebuild a new police force of people without collaborationist backgrounds. This was a factor accounting for the legitimacy of the revolutionary government, Charles Armstrong notes, although the security structure still built on the foundations of the old in its striving for total information control. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945&ndash1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 205.

11 Edward Wismer, Police Adviser, to Director of National Police, June 6, 1947, USAFIK, RG 554, Records Regarding Korean Political Affairs (1945&ndash1948), box 26 Kim, The Unending Korean War, 185 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:502. An American police supervisor commented that there was enough evidence on both Chang and Chough to&ldquohang them several times over&rdquo (ibid.). Hodge justified their appointment by pointing to their fierce anticommunism and loyalty to the American command. The CIA characterized Chang, managing director of the bank of Taegu in the 1940s who hailed from one of Korea&rsquos oldest and wealthiest families, as &ldquoan intelligent, ambitious opportunist who, while basically friendly to the United States, is erratic and unreliable when excited.&rdquo NSCF, CIA,box 4, HSTL.

12 Stiles and Lyman, &ldquoThe Administration of Justice in Korea under the Japanese and in South Korea under the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea to August 15, 1958&rdquo RDS, Korea &ldquoHistory of the Korean National Police,&rdquo August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 Larsen, &ldquoPolice and Public Security,&rdquo 5, 6.

13 &ldquoInterview with Lt. Col. Earle L. Miller, Chief of Police of Kyonggi-do, 15 Nov. 1945to 29 Dec. 1945,&rdquo February 3, 1946 Harry S. Maglin, &ldquoOrganization of National Police of Korea,&rdquo December 27, 1945, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 18 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 187 Arthur F. Brandstatter, Personnel File, Michigan State University Archives.

14 &ldquoInterview with Major Arthur F. Brandstatter, Police Bureau, 7 December 1945,&rdquo USAFIK Okinawa, box 25.

15 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo November 13, 1945, GHQ-SCAP &ldquoHistory of the Korean National Police,&rdquo August 7, 1948&ldquoPolice Bureau Renovates Good But Wrecked System,&rdquo The Corps Courier, February 12, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 18 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 187 &ldquoChief of Korean Uniformed Police Visits U.S. Provost Marshall,&rdquo Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 44 (July&ndashAugust 1953): 220.

16 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo November 13, 1945, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26 J. H. Berrean to Major Millard Shaw, Acting Advisor, Department of Police,July 27, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 D. L. Nicolson to J. Edgar Hoover, March 29, 1949, RDS, Korea, file 895 Henderson, Korea, 142&ndash43. On the Chinese precedent, see Mary Miles,&ldquoThe Navy Launched a Dragon,&rdquo unpublished manuscript, Naval War College, Newport,R.I., chap. 28, &ldquoUnit Nine, School of Intelligence and Counter-Espionage.&rdquo

17 Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, The United States Army Historical Series, ed. Walter G. Hermes (Washington, D.C.: OCMH,GPO, 1962), 13 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Random House, 2010), 134 Peter Clemens, &ldquoCaptain James Hausman, U.S. Military Adviser to Korea,1946&ndash1948: The Intelligence Man on the Spot,&rdquo Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (2002):184 John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), 100.

18 Allan R. Millett, &ldquoCaptain James R. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945&ndash1950,&rdquo Armed Forces and Society 23 (Summer 1997): 503&ndash37 Clemens, &ldquoCaptain James Hausman,&rdquo 170 Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945&ndash1950: A House Burning (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 173.

19 Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945&ndash1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 290 Richard D. Robinson, &ldquoA Personal Journey through Time and Space,&rdquo Journal of International Business Studies 25, no.3 (1994): 436.

20 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:267 Henderson, Korea, 145 Richard C. Allen, Korea&rsquos Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1960).

21 Max Bishop to Charles Stelle, &ldquoAnswers to Questions on the Korean Situation in Light of the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops,&rdquo February 10, 1949, RG 59, RDS, Records of the Division of Research for Far East Reports (1946&ndash1952), box 4, folder 1.

22 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:267 Donald Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die? (Brooksville, Fla.: Vanity Press, 1981),119 John Reed Hodge to Douglas MacArthur, September 27, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box25 &ldquoCommunist Capabilities in South Korea,&rdquo Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA, February 21, 1949, PSF, Truman Papers, HSTL.

23 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 18 &ldquoStrikes/Riots,&rdquo September 1946&ndashMay 1947, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25, folder 3 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 17 27 Everett F. Drumright to Secretary of State, &ldquoAmending of Organization of National Traitors Acts,&rdquo December 22, 1948, RDS, Korea, file 895 Henderson, Korea, 146 Richard D. Robinson, &ldquoBetrayal of a Nation,&rdquo unpublished manuscript, 1960, 147 (courtesy of Harvard Yenching Library) Daily Korean Bulletin, June 14, 1952, NSCF, CIA, box 4, HSTL. Lee Sang Ho, editor of the suspended Chung Ang Shin Mun, and Kwang Tai Hyuk, chief of the newspaper&rsquos administrative section, were characteristically sentenced to eighteen months&rsquo hard labor for printing &ldquoinflammatory articles.&rdquo For harsh police repression of the labor movement, see Hugh Deane, The Korean War, 1945&ndash1953 (San Francisco: China Books, 1999), 40.

24 Millard Shaw, &ldquoPolice Comments on Guerrilla Situation,&rdquo August 6, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26 George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 88 Kim, The Unending Korean War, 186 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,2:207. U.S. military intelligence may have collaborated in the assassination of another of Rhee&rsquos rivals, Kim Ku, who was opposed to American intervention. Ku&rsquos assassin, An Tu-hui, was released from Taejon penitentiary after a visit by a U.S. Army counterintelligence officer and was afterwards promoted to army major.

25 Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die, 135 &ldquoSummary Conditions in Korea,&rdquo November 1&ndash15, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo June 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 26. Some of these rackets involved U.S. soldiers. An army colonel, for example, looted over four thousand cases of precious artworks from museums, shrines and temples. After he was caught, he was sent home on &ldquosick leave.&rdquo Robinson, &ldquoBetrayal of a Nation,&rdquo 290.

26 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:188.

27 &ldquoHistory of the Police Department,&rdquo USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 Robinson, &ldquoA Personal Journey through Time and Space,&rdquo 437 Robinson, &ldquoBetrayal of a Nation,&rdquo 155. In North Korea, while dissidents were sent to labor and &ldquore-education&rdquo camps, the use of torture to extract confessions was abolished and according to the leading authority on the revolution, rarely practiced. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 208.

28 &ldquoKorean-American Conference,&rdquo October 29, 1946 and &ldquoReport Special Agent Wittmer, G-2,Summary, November 3, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, boxes 25 and 26.

29 &ldquoKorean-American Conference&rdquo Robinson, &ldquoBetrayal of a Nation,&rdquo 151 &ldquoSouth Korea: A Police State?&rdquo February 16, 1948, RDS, Division of Research for Far East Reports (1946&ndash 1952), box 3 &ldquoCommunist Capabilities in South Korea.&rdquo

30 Kim, The Unending Korean War, 123.

31 James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941&ndash1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 77 Gayn, Japan Diary, 371. Yi Pom Sok&rsquos OSS connections are revealed in Robert John Myers, Korea in the Cross Currents: A Century of Struggle and the Crisis of Reunification (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 74.

32 Adviser Millard Shaw considered the cross-border operations acts &ldquobordering on terrorism&rdquo which &ldquoprecipitate retaliatory raids . . . from the North.&rdquo Report, Major Millard Shaw, Acting Advisor, &ldquoGuard of the 38th Parallel by the National Police,&rdquo November 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25, folder 3 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:195. The first to challenge the standard interpretation was I. F. Stone in The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), originally published in 1952.

33 &ldquoPolice Fraternization and Being Bribed by Prisoners,&rdquo August 28, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26, folder 10 G-2 Periodic Report, &ldquoCivil Disturbances,&rdquo Seoul, Korea, September 1947, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 Henderson, Korea, 144.

34 Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, 288 John Caldwell, with Lesley Frost, The Korea Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), 8 Robinson, &ldquoBetrayal of a Nation,&rdquo 156.

35 Roy C. Stiles and Albert Lyman, &ldquoThe Administration of Justice in Korea under the Japanese and in South Korea under the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea to August 15, 1948,&rdquo paper by American Advisory Staff, Department of Justice, RDS, Korea, file 895 &ldquoJoint Korean-American Conference,&rdquo October 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 26 Gayn, Japan Diary, 423.

36 &ldquoSouth Korea: A Police State?&rdquo February 16, 1948, RDS, Division of Research for Far East Reports, 1946&ndash1952, box 3.

37 Larsen, &ldquoPolice and Public Security,&rdquo 60.

38 &ldquoA History of the Korean National Police (KNP),&rdquo August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 &ldquoLet Us Avenge the Victims of Kwangju,&rdquo People&rsquos Committee pamphlet. August 25,1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 1:364&ndash66, 550.

39 George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle (London: Zed Books, 1990), 12 Henderson, Korea, 147 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:356&ndash57. At Yongchon, 350 kilometers from Seoul, a mob of ten thousand disarmed and kidnapped forty policemen after ambushing the police station and burned the homes of rightists.

40 John R. Hodge to Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, April 17, 1948 Police Diary, Major Albert Brown, Survey, October 1946, USAFIK, Okinawa, box 26 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo July 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 34 Henderson, Korea, 146 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:357. Henderson notes that not one identifiable North Korean agent was involved in the protests, which leftists claimed exceeded anything that had taken place under the Japanese.

41 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities,&rdquo February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 182 Richard J. Johnston, &ldquoPolitical Jailing in Korea Denied: Authorities Say 17,867 Held Are Accused of Theft, Riot, Murder and Other Crimes,&rdquo New York Times, November 26, 1947 Richard J. Johnston, &ldquoSeoul Aids Police in Checking Reds,&rdquo New York Times, September 6, 1949 Richard J. Johnston, &ldquoKorean Reds Fight Police and Others,&rdquo New York Times, July 29, 1947&ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo September 1946, GHQ-SCAP, 22 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo December 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 165 Henderson, Korea, 167 Maglin, &ldquoLooking Back in History,&rdquo 69.

42 &ldquoHistory of the Police Department&rdquo and &ldquoInvestigation of the Police,&rdquo July 30, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25 &ldquoVisit to Wanju Jail,&rdquo August 1, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box 27, folder 1 &ldquoSanitary Inspection of Jails,&rdquo USAFIK Okinawa, box 26, folder 4 Gayn, Japan Diary, 406, 407 Robinson, &ldquoBetrayal of a Nation,&rdquo 152.

43 Major General W. F. Dean to Lt. Commander John R. Hodge, &ldquoReview by the Departmentof Justice of Persons Confined to Prisons or Police Jails Who Might Be Considered Political Prisoners,&rdquo April 5, 1948, USAFIK, Records of the General Headquarters, Far EastCommand, General Correspondences (1943&ndash1946), AI 1370, box 1.

44 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities,&rdquo April 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 170 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo July 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 22.

45 &ldquoSummation of Non-Military Activities,&rdquo January 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 181 &ldquoReport of Daily Police Activities,&rdquo USAFIK Okinawa, box 27, folder Civil Police &ldquoSummationof Non-Military Activities in Korea,&rdquo August 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 196 Larsen, &ldquoPolice and Public Security,&rdquo 133, 145 Bertrand M. Roehner, &ldquoRelations between Allied Forces and the Population of Korea,&rdquo Working Report, Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics, University of Paris, 2010, 168.

46 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:252.

47 Cumings, The Korean War, 122 Millett, &ldquoCaptain James R. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army,&rdquo 503.

48 &ldquoCheju-do: Summation of Non-Military Activities,&rdquo June 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 160 Merrill, Korea, 66.

49 &ldquoField Report, Mission to Korea, U.S. Military Advisory Group to ROK,&rdquo RG 469, Mission to Korea, U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK, Records Related to the KNP (1948&ndash1961) (hereafter KNP), box 4, folder Cheju-do Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:250&ndash59 Merrill, Korea, 125. My thanks to Cheju-do native Sinae Hyun for providing me with a clearer understanding of the internal dynamics fueling the violence during this period. After the massacre, the U.S. military command oversaw an increased police presence and stepped up local training efforts at the Cheju-do police school, which they financed. William F. Dean to Director of National Police, July 30, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa,box 26, folder Cheju-do.

50 Merrill, Korea, 113 Time, November 14, 1948, 6.

51 &ldquoAward of UN Service Medal to the National Police, Mission to Korea, Office of Government Services, Senior Adviser to KNP,&rdquo February 10, 1954, PSD, GHQ-SCAP (1955&ndash1957), box 1, folder Awards and Decorations &ldquoPolicy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the Underdeveloped States,&rdquo November 20, 1961, JFKL, POF, box 98 Kim, The Unending Korean War, 122 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (NewYork: Doubleday, 2007), 56, 57.

52 Charles J. Hanley and Jae-Soon Chang, &ldquoSummer of Terror: At Least 100,000 Said Executed by Korean Ally of US in 1950,&rdquo Japan Focus, July 23, 2008.

53 James Cameron, Point of Departure (London: Oriel Press, 1978), 131&ndash32 McDonald, Korea, 42 also Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die, 128. CIC agent Donald Nichol, a confidant of Rhee, reported that he stood by helplessly in Suwan as &ldquothe condemned were hastily pushed into line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed in the grave. . . . I tried to stop this from happening, however, I gave up when I saw I was wasting my time&rdquo (ibid.)

54 Hanley and Chang, &ldquoSummer of Terror&rdquo Bruce Cumings, &ldquoThe South Korean Massacre at Taejon: New Evidence on U.S. Responsibility and Cover-Up,&rdquo Japan Focus, July23, 2008 Cumings, Korea&rsquos Place in the Sun, 25 Kim, The Unending Korean War Halliday and Cumings, Korea Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare fromthe Korean War (New York: Holt, 2000).

55 On U.S. strategic designs in Southeast Asia, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt, 2000) Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945&ndash1980 (New York: Pantheon,1990) John W. Dower, &ldquoOccupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945&ndash1950,&rdquo in America&rsquos Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations, ed. Edward Friedman and MarkSelden (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 186&ndash207.

56 Colonel Albert Haney, &ldquoOCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,&rdquo August 5,1955, DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal Security &ldquoAnalysis of Internal Security Situationin ROK Pursuant to Recommended Action for 1290-d,&rdquo in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955&ndash1957, pt. 2, Korea, ed. Louis Smith (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 183.

57 &ldquoBandit Activity Report,&rdquo May 1, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 4 Park Byong Bae, Chief, Security Division, &ldquoOperation Report,&rdquo July 1, 1954, and &ldquoPeriodic Operations Report,&rdquo May 27, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 4 &ldquoResults of Police Operations,&rdquo July 15, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 2 &ldquoSummary of NSC Action 1290-d Report on Korea,&rdquo DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal Security.

58 &ldquoG-2 Section Report,&rdquo February 2, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 4.

59 &ldquoQuarterly Historical Report,&rdquo July 10, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 4 also &ldquoG-2 Section Report,&rdquo March 25 May 2, 1954.

60 &ldquoJohnny&rdquo to Police Adviser, &ldquoBandit Activity Report,&rdquo May 1, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 4.

61 &ldquoPolice Wipe Out Last Known Guerrilla Band and &ldquoRed Bandit Chief Slain, TwoKilled,&rdquo Korea Times, December 1956, NA.

63 William Maxfield to Director, NP [National Police], ROK, February 16, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1 Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans ,and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 28&ndash30 Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of Korea, March 27&ndashApril 9, 1975 (London: Amnesty International, 1977), 29 William J. Lederer, A Nation of Sheep(New York: Norton, 1961), 79 &ldquoCombined Korean Communities in USA Picket White House to Protest Carnage of Korean Youth,&rdquo April 22, 1960, DDEL, OCB, White House Office, Central Files, General File, Korea, box 821 Peer De Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and theUses of Intelligence (New York: Times Books, 1978), 163.

64 &ldquoSolon Alleges Police Attack,&rdquo Korea Times, October 26, 1956 &ldquoCaptain Warren S. Olin: Chungmu Distinguished Military Service Medal with Silver Star,&rdquo March 1, 1955, Republic of Korea, courtesy National Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis see also &ldquoCulprit Charges Police Plotted Murder,&rdquo Korea Times, December 15, 1956 &ldquoMay 5 Riot Nets Prison Term for 14,&rdquo Korea Times, May 14, 1956. A Pacific war veteran from New Jersey, Olin went on to head the army&rsquos Criminal Investigation Branch in Vietnam.

65 Kim, The Unending Korean War, 201&ndash2 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:265. For eight months in 1947, Kim was Chang Taek-sang&rsquos personal bodyguard.

66 Muccio, quoted in Cumings, The Korean War, 183. One document preserved at the National Archives which points to the close symbiotic relationship between U.S. advisers and General Kim was a letter from Colonel Joseph Pettet of the Public Safety Branch thanking him for &ldquothe wonderful party you gave us on October 29, 1954. The food and entertainment was superb as always at a &lsquoTiger&rsquo Kim party.&rdquo Joseph Pettet to Chief Kim, November 1,1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1.

67 &ldquoQuarterly Historical Report,&rdquo July 10, 1954, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 4, folder 3 Albert R. Haney, &ldquoObservations and Suggestions Concerning OISP,&rdquo January 30, 1957, DDEL, OCB, box 18, folder Internal Security.

68 Lyman Lemnitzer to Thomas Wilson, Assistant Chief of Public Safety Division, Senior Adviser to KNP, USOM Mission to Korea, June 5, 1956, KNP (1955&ndash1957), box 4, folder 3 &ldquoPeriodic Operations Report,&rdquo May 27, 1954, KNP (1955&ndash1957), box 4 &ldquo1956 Guide,&rdquo KNP (1955&ndash1957), box 1, folder National Police Laboratory File. On Goin, see Lauren J. Goin, &ldquoDetails Reproduced by Metal Casting,&rdquo Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and PoliceScience 43 (July&ndashAugust 1952): 250&ndash55 Lauren J. Goin, William H. McKee, and Paul L. Kirk, &ldquoHuman Hair Studies: Application of the Micro-determinant of Comparative Density,&rdquoJournal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 43 (July&ndashAugust 1952): 263&ndash73.

69 MSUG Monthly Report, October 1960, MSUA, Vietnam Project, box 679. On the repressive nature of Chiang&rsquos secret police apparatus in Taiwan, see Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo&rsquos Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). Taylor quotes a CIA operative who reported hearing executions being carried out in a soccer stadium: &ldquoChing-kuo got all the communists but also a lot of others&rdquo (211).

70 Gene E. Carte and Elaine Carte, Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905&ndash1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 49 Nathan Douthit,&ldquoAugust Vollmer, Berkeley&rsquos First Chief of Police, and the Emergence of Police Professionalism,&rdquoCalifornia Historical Review 54 (Summer 1975): 101&ndash24 O. W. Wilson, &ldquoAugust Vollmer,&rdquo Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 44 (May&ndashJune 1953): 95.

71 Ray Foreaker to Michigan State College, East Lansing, March 9, 1956, KNP (1955&ndash1957), box 1, folder 3. Marc Logie, who fought with the GMD and French foreign legion, succeeded Foreaker as PSD chief.

72 See William Turner, The Police Establishment (New York: G. P. Putnam&rsquos Sons, 1968), 170. On racial problems, see Edward Keating, Free Huey! (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1971), and the memoirs of Black Panther leaders.

73 &ldquoList of Police Officers Who Have Been to the United States,&rdquo KNP (1948&ndash1961), box 3, folder Korean Student Records &ldquoChief of Korean Uniformed Police Visits U.S. Provost Marshall,&rdquo Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 44 (July&ndashAugust 1953): 220.

74 Turner, The Police Establishment, 72 Joseph G. Woods, &ldquoThe Progressives and the Police: Urban Reform and the Professionalization of the Los Angeles Police&rdquo (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1973).

75 &ldquoJuvenile Reformatories,&rdquo September 23, 1955, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder 3 &ldquoInformation Related to the Establishment of a Reformatory,&rdquo KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 2.

76 American embassy, Tehran, to Secretary of State, &ldquoUse of Light Aircraft in Opium Eradication Campaign,&rdquo September 26, 1969, RG 286, USAID, Operations Division, Africa and the Near East and South Asia Branch, box 62, folder 2.

77 J. P Anninos, &ldquoNarrative Report of Korean Gangster Operations in Pusan,&rdquo February 11, 1954 and &ldquoOperations of Gangsters,&rdquo KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder 3 &ldquoNarcotic Trade and Black-Marketing,&rdquo July 2, 1955, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder Monthly Narcotics Reports &ldquoBlack Market,&rdquo June 20, 1955, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder Black Market Activities.

78 &ldquoReport on Conduct of Korean Military Police Personnel,&rdquo June 27, 1955, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder 3 &ldquoReport of Accident with Fatality,&rdquo March 16, 1955 and &ldquoSummary of UN-ROK Incidents Reported by the KNP,&rdquo May 1955, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder 2 &ldquoSummary of US-ROK Offenses and Incidents,&rdquo KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 1, folder Coordinating Committee Law and Order &ldquoDemonstrations at Inchon,&rdquo August 18, 1955, KNP (1953&ndash1955), box 3.

79 &ldquoPolicy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the UnderdevelopedStates,&rdquo POF, box 98, November 20, 1961.

80 See Byong Kook-Kim and Ezra Vogel, eds., The Park Chung-Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), 52 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:266. Park&rsquos treachery after the Yosu rebellion resulted in the purge of hundreds of constabulary officers and the death of many former friends. Hausman&rsquos involvement in the coup is acknowledged in Clemons, &ldquoCaptain James Hausman,&rdquo 193.

81 Current Foreign Relations, &ldquoKorea Purifies Political Activities,&rdquo March 21, 1962, JFKL, NSF, box 431 Ogle, South Korea, 23.

82 Lauren J. Goin, Lt. Shannon, and Arthur M. Thurston, &ldquoSurvey of Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korea,&rdquo May 1966, RG 286, USAID, OPS, Programs, Surveys, and Evaluations, box 6 Johnson, Blowback, 107 De Silva, Sub Rosa, xi. De Silva incidentally helped recruit Nazi spy Reinhard Gehlen after World War II and was involved with the Phoenix program in Vietnam. An OSS spy in the Kunming station in China in World War II, Thurston also served with the police programs in Indonesia, Libya, and Somalia.

83 &ldquoKorea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean Forces, Intelligence Annex to Study on Korea, Prepared by Defense Intelligence Agency,&rdquo April 1962, JFKL, NSF, box 431 Thomas A. Finn and James A. Cretecos, &ldquoEvaluation of the Public Safety Program, USAID, Korea, June 28, 1971&ndashJuly 18, 1971,&rdquo http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABZ913.pdf Goin, Shannon, and Thurston, &ldquoSurvey of Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korea.&rdquo On Jessup&rsquos tenure in Indiana, see Marilyn S. Olsen, Gangsters, Gunfire, and Political Intrigue: The Story of the Indiana State Police (Indianapolis: .38 Special Press), 2001, 75 Julien Mader, Who&rsquos Who in the CIA (Berlin: J. Mader, 1968), 261.

84 &ldquoKorea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean Forces,&rdquo April 1962, JFKL, NSC, box 431 Byron Engle to Frank Kolnacki, December 13, 1968, TSD, box 5, folder Korea Lauren J. Goin, Memoir, April 1991, Institute of Inter-American Affairs Collection, Courtesy of University of Illinois at Springfield Archives, Special Collections. CIA agent George &ldquoSpeedy&rdquo Gaspard stated that police under his command &ldquokilled 119 [North Korean] agents . . . . We didn&rsquot take any prisoners, that was difficult to do. They wouldn&rsquot just surrender.&rdquo In George Schultz Jr., The Secret War against Hanoi (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 58.

85 &ldquoAlleged ROK Massacres,&rdquo RG 472, Records of the Armed Forces in South East Asia (RAFSEA), Criminal Investigations Branch, boxes 34&ndash36 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 313 Frank Baldwin, Diane Jones, and Michael Jones, America&rsquos Rented Troops: South Koreans in Vietnam (Philadelphia: American Friends Services Committee, 1975) Bernd Greiner, War without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 190.

86. Interview with Jack Goin, December 9, 1975, and Byron Engle, January 27, 1976, in William D. Steeves Jr., &ldquoThe U.S. Public Safety Program, Its Evolution and Demise&rdquo (master&rsquos thesis, George Washington University, School of International Affairs, 1975), 9 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea. Many ideologically driven scholars adopt the same perspective in presenting Korea as a successful case of U.S. foreign policy, Brazinsky included. Paul Wolfowitz argued in a 2009 New York Times editorial that South Korea should serve as a model for U.S. &ldquonation-building&rdquo in Iraq.

87 Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of Korea, 27 March&ndash9 April 1975, 8&ndash9, 37. See also &ldquoNew Repression in South Korea,&rdquo New York Times, May 29, 1980 Suh Sung, Unbroken Spirits: Nineteen Years in South Korea&rsquos Gulag, trans. Jean Inglis (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

88 See Henry Scott-Stokes and Jai-Eui Lee, eds., The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea&rsquos Tiananmen, foreword by Kim Dae Jung (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000) Timothy Shorrock, &ldquoThe U.S. Role in Korea in 1979&ndash1980,&rdquo Sisa Journal, February 28, 1996, www.kimsoft.com/Korea/Kwangju3.htm Kim, The Unending Korean War, ix Johnson, Blowback, 116. Richard Holbrooke, who later served as special envoy to Afghanistan, was among the State Department officials who gave a green light for and then covered up the atrocity.

89 Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 8.


IV. Public opinion and antiwar dissent in the United States

Manufacturing consent: Media coverage of the war

Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman in a landmark 1989 study, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, examine the influence of corporate control of the mass media and the subtle rhetorical manipulations used to inculcate consent for existing U.S. policies in foreign affairs. They adopt a “propaganda model,” refuting the notion of a free press. The media, they argue, draw too heavily on government sources for information, generally accept official proclamations about the nobility of the U.S. role in the world, and focus attention on atrocities committed by enemies rather than allies who kill only “worthy victims.”[159]

The U.S. News and World Report was typical in attributing the war to an offensive by the “Kremlin.”[163] Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote an article in the September 2, 1950, issue of Saturday Evening Post, “The Lessons of Korea,” suggesting that the U.S. had not done enough to deter Soviet aggression or contain Soviet imperialism. “The armed strength of the United States,” the Alsops wrote, “was too slight to instill in the masters of the Kremlin any healthy fear of reprisals. Hence Korea was attacked.” The story was buttressed by a photo of a bound American soldier who had been machine gunned. The columnists, who had close ties to U.S. intelligence, went on to warn that Korea was but the “first episode of an attempt to bring all Asia and all Europe within the Soviet empire.” The real Soviet “goal was not just to seize South Korea, but “make the living death of the slave society the universal condition of mankind, from the shores of the Atlantic to the islands of Japan, from the icy cliffs of Spitsbergen to the bright sands of cape common.”[164] Refuted by Soviet scholars who emphasize Stalin’s cautious and pragmatic approach to foreign policy, such analyses helped engender public support not only for the Korean War but also for the massive military buildup that accompanied it, keeping the U.S. public in a state of omnipresent fear.[165]

Marguerite Higgins was the first female war correspondent to win a Pulitzer Prize

The best war correspondents like Marguerite Higgins, a Pulitzer Prize winner who had been with the U.S. army when they liberated Dachau, captured the disillusionment of U.S. soldiers and brutality of the war. Writing in the Saturday Evening Post on August 19, 1950, Higgins said in the first weeks of the American retreat, she had “seen war harden many of our young soldiers into savagely bitter men,” noting that some had thrown down their arms or bolted in the thick of battle, “cursing their government for what they thought was embroilment in a hopeless cause.” One GI told her to tell the American people the truth that it is an “utterly useless war,” stating that “the commies cared little for life” and were “willing to die when our boys are not.”[166] Higgins, however, never cared to explore precisely why the North Koreans were willing to die in such great numbers and never seems to have understood the revolutionary social consciousness that pervaded much of Asia and Africa as the old imperial world order dissipated in the aftermath of World War II. Instead she referred to the North Koreans as “red invaders” and claimed in a book endorsed by Syngman Rhee that “Korea had served as a “kind of international alarm clock to wake up the world [about communist perfidy],” and about how “we needed to arm and produce tough, hard fighting soldiers….before it was too late.”[167] She was, as these comments imply, a major supporter of U.S. policy in the Cold War.

Henry Luce’s Time Magazine, was among the staunchest supporters of the war, championing Syngman Rhee in the same vein as Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi). Born to missionary parents in China and a key member of the China lobby, Luce used Time as a “secular pulpit” to promote what he considered America’s “God ordained global mission” to spread Western capitalist and democratic ideals and rollback the spread of communism in Asia. Journalists like Theodore White, who did not share Luce’s view and were sympathetic to communist ideology, left the magazine or were fired.[172]

Wilfred Burchett: Reporting the Other Side

Australian correspondent Wilfred G. Burchett

Australian War correspondent Wilfred Burchett was an exception in reporting the war from the North Korean and Chinese side. Starting his career in the mold of the “heroic explorer type who had secured the empire’s greatness” as his biographer Tom Heenan put it, Burchett had covered the Sino-Japanese and Pacific War where he marveled at the scale of the U.S. air raids, still “too blinkered by the pyrotechnics to notice the victims.” Burchett’s politics shifted, however, when he broke through the military censors and reported on the dropping of the atomic bomb. His article for the London Daily Express was titled “The Atomic Plague,” and said that the attacks had made a “blitzed Pacific island seem like Eden.” Arriving in Korea to cover the peace talks at Kaesong and Panmunjom in July 1951, he and his British colleague Alan Winnington, who wrote for The Daily Worker, criticized the American negotiators for needlessly prolonging the war and napalming and bombing the residence of the North Korean delegation chief, General Nam-Il. They also reported on ROK police killings in Taejon and the mistreatment of Communist POWs at Koje-do Island, including in the adoption of unethical medical experiments, torture and illegal recruitment of the prisoners for covert operations, and accused the U.S. Air Force of conducting bacteriological warfare raids.

The responsibility of intellectuals: “Crackpot Realists” and the New Mandarins

Historian and presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Schlesinger, as it turns out, wrote an important book on Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War with liberal journalist Richard Rovere, The General and the President (1951), which provided a strong defense of Truman administration policies. Supporting Korea as a just war, Schlesinger and Rovere wrote:

if the insolent aggression of the North Koreans had gone unchallenged, millions of people throughout the free world, including this important part of it, would have found rich confirmation of their fear that Russian power was in fact invincible, that American big talk was shameless bluff, and that the United Nations was a snare and delusion…. This is why President Truman determined to make at least a limited challenge to Soviet power. He did it not because he thought that the fall of Los Angeles would follow inexorably the fall of Seoul, but because he wished to show both the Communist world and the non-Communist world that the United States was not a flour-flusher and that the United Nations – or collective security – could be made to work.[176]

Henry Kissinger, 1957, author of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Photo by Bettmann-Corbis)

Henry Kissinger, an influential defense intellectual at Harvard University and proponent of a ruthless brand of real-politick appealing to power-brokers in Washington, fit the norm in considering Truman’s decision to intervene in Korea to be “courageous.” However, in his 1957 CFR book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, he sided with the MacArthur faction, advocating the utility of restricted nuclear war. Kissinger criticized the doctrine of limited war, believing that the U.S. should have taken advantage of its military superiority. Fashioning himself as a modern-day Metternich (Austrian practitioner of real-politick) Kissinger raised the question of whether the U.S.S.R. “did not have more to lose from an all-out war than we did.” Be that as it may, he said, “our announced reluctance to engage in all out war gave the Soviet bloc a psychological advantage.” Kissinger went on to speculate that if the U.S. had “pushed back the Chinese armies even to the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, we would have administered a setback to Communist power in its first trial at arms with the free world.“[182]

Grassroots antiwar activism and dissent

A coordinated antiwar movement never developed during the Korean War, despite some similarities to the Vietnam War. Doubts as to the wisdom of the war were silenced by the repressive climate of McCarthyism.[186] Principled humanitarian opposition to the war was voiced by black anti-colonial activists such as W.E.B. DuBois, who was purged from the NAACP, dissident Hollywood writers like Dalton Trumbo and John Lawson, and pacifist individuals and organizations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and War Resister’s League (WRL).

Mural commemorating A. J. Muste on the War Resisters League building in New York

Abraham J. Muste, a proponent of Gandhian non-violent revolutionary pacifism and a Presbyterian minister affiliated with the FOR, considered Dresden and Hiroshima to be symbols of the nation’s lack of moral and humanitarian scruples that carried over into the Korean War. In his 1950 FOR pamphlet, Korea: Spark to Set a World on Fire? Muste wrote that the U.S. was intervening in a civil war on behalf of a corrupt and repressive puppet regime associated with a “white nation” that many identified with Western conquest, all of which was sure to invite Korean resistance. The war was thus a futile undertaking, and a danger to the world as well, as it threatened to ignite World War III. Muste called for nonviolent disobedience directed against it.[187]

Paul Robeson, the great singer and civil rights leader called the Korean War “the most shameful war in which our country has ever been engaged”:

A hundred thousand American dead, wounded and missing have been listed in this war … and more than that we have killed, maimed and rendered homeless a million Koreans, all in the name of preserving Western civilization. U.S. troops have acted like beasts, as do all aggressive, invading, imperialist armies. North and South of the 38 th parallel, they have looked upon the Korean people with contempt, calling them filthy names, raped their women, lorded it over old women and children, and shot prisoners in the back.[196]

Scott Nearing, a former economist at the University of Pennsylvania who had been fired for opposing World War I, was another fierce and prescient critic of government policy. Nearing emphasized that Truman and Acheson’s big idea that peace could be secured through concentrated power had been previously attempted by Julius Caesar. Pointing to the grand imperial designs of MacArthur, including the desire to convert Taiwan into an imperial Pacific center for the purpose of dominating all Asiatic ports, Nearing characterized the Cold War as a “mad adventure” that would “deplete natural resources, squander capital, divert human ingenuity and enterprise into destructive channels and deluge the human race with blood and tears,” as Korea exemplified. Nearing further lamented how science and technology had been mobilized for the purpose of increasing the destructive potential of explosives, incendiaries, chemical agencies and bacteriological forces, and that industrial organizations and academic institutions had placed their facilities at the disposal of a government which aims to destroy and kill with maximum effectiveness, using its military apparatus to effect “organized destruction” and “wholesale murder.”[197]

Folk singer Woodie Guthrie

In an ode to “Mr. Sickyman Ree,” Woody adopted subtle political commentary mixed with sarcasm in proclaiming, “Mister Sickiman Ree, Dizzy Old Sigman Ree, you can’t fool pore me!” “Korean Bad Weather” and “Han River Woman” conveyed Woody’s desire for the “GI Joes from Wall Street” as he referred to U.S. soldiers in several songs, to “lay down their killing irons and walk home.” In Han River Mud,” he sang that I “told you not to come here Joe with your Wall Street jeep all stuck in the land. What did you drive here for Joe, try to steal my land from me.”

American soldiers’ experience and disillusionment

In a critical autobiographical war-story called “The Secret,” author James Drought, a Korean War veteran, tells the story of Frank Nolan, a working class kid from Chicago he knew who enlisted in the army to see the world and escape working for Ford Motor Company. Trained as an infantryman, Nolan was sent out on a dangerous mission to reclaim a nondescript hill the “gooks” had occupied, largely as a means of impressing a visiting Congressional delegation. The North Korean forces had learned of the attack in advance and slaughtered his unit Nolan lost his leg. After being awarded a bronze star and Purple Heart while lying in hospice, Nolan told the Congressman and General sent to congratulate him that “they could cram all the goddam medals up their ass.” Nolan told Drought as he recounts it: “You know what they did? They smiled at me. They said they understood.” “Understood what?” Drought then asked him. “I don’t know,” Nolan responded. “The dirty cocksuckers just patted me on the shoulder and said they understood.”[203]

Film star Marilyn Monroe helped boost morale in Korea

The class dimension in Drought’s story is epitomized in an earlier passage where he laments how he had discovered while working “like a slob” for a finance company that the “fat cats are not content to exploit us, bleed us, work us for the rest of our lives at their benefit, but they want us to win them some glory too. . . . This is why every once in a while they start a war for us to fight in.” The experts had predicted a depression if it hadn’t been for the Korean War and the “shot in the arm [the war] gave to production, business, and even to religion – since right away everybody returned to church to pray for their brave sons overseas – was something the ‘fat cats’ had to have to prevent going under and becoming poor folks like the rest of us.” Ernest Hemingway and others had said that war provided a once in a lifetime opportunity to test men’s manhood and courage, though it was not mentioned “what those would discover who lay ripped open after the battle, bleeding, dying, dead from monstrous wounds.”[204]

U.S. soldiers learn of the armistice

One platoon sergeant tellingly titled his memoir, Korea: A Freezing Hell on Earth (1998). As in Vietnam, the morale of American soldiers declined with the discovery that “superiority in weapons was no guarantee of victory,” and more broadly, because most GIs did not “have the slightest idea why they were fighting in these far off hills.” Desertion rates reached 22.5 out of 1000 by 1952, causing concern within the military. After returning from the funeral of slain comrades, one Marine stated that the “saddest thing was that not one of them knew why they were dying.” Black GI’s were most prone to question “why they should fight when “we have organizations like the Klu Klux Klan running certain people out of places [back home] because of their color…. Have the communists ever enslaved our people? Have they ever raped our women? Have they ever castrated our fathers, grandfathers, uncles or cousins?”[205]

Not all veterans who became critical of the war were progressive in their outlook, to be sure. A good number believed with the political right that liberal government leaders were politicizing the war and hamstringing the Generals to the detriment of U.S. troops. Many also considered the Koreans pejoratively as “gooks,” a term used by Drought in dialogues in “The Secret,” and characterized Korea as a primitive country and hence not worth sacrificing themselves for or “saving.” Few understood the Korea’s colonial history or the North Korean revolution, as historian Bruce Cumings has noted, and there was little understanding of the United States role as an heir to the colonial empires.

Letter exchange between a questioning Marine, his father and Dean Acheson


Mark Gayn - History

HIS 195,
INTRODUCTION TO EAST ASIAN HISTORY

A CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW
SUPPORTED BY HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

This approach was outlined in the original syllabus for the course as designed by Professor Kang (who was scheduled to teach the course this semester). It focuses on an historical overview and the review of original source documents connected with each of the time periods considered.

To accommodate our current schedule, some of the material originally considered has been excluded. Journal and Essay Assignments have yet to be incorporated in the schedule which follows however, the topics and readings indicated give a sense of the direction that would be taken in this iteration of the remainder of the remaining course of study.

Qing China

Ebrey, et al 308-329
Lord Macartney, “Audience with Qianlong”
Lord Macartney, “Description of China’s Government”
Emperor Qianlong, “Rejection of Macartney’s Demands”

Tokugawa Japan

Ebrey, et al 331-347
Commodore Perry, journal excerpt

Ebrey, et al 366-396
Xu Naiji, “Memorial on Legalizing Opium”
Zhu Zun, “Memorial on Banning Opium”
Lord Palmerston, “Despatch from Lord Palmerston to the Minister of the Emperor of China”

Taiping Rebellion and Self Strengthening

Precepts and Odes Published by Hong Xiuquan
Zeng Guofan, “A Proclamation Against the Bandits of Guangdong and Guangxi”
“The Taiping Economic Program”

Meiji Restoration

Ebrey, et al 397-411
Hotta Masayoshi, “Memorial on the Harris Proposal”
Yoshida Shôin, “Testimony of a Madman”
“The Charter Oath,” “The Constitution of 1868,” and “The Imperial Rescript on Education”

Meiji Enlightenment and Conflict

Ebrey, et al 412-429
Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Encouragement of Learning” and “Goodbye to Asia”
“Anti-Government Movement, 1874-1877”
Saigô Takamori, “Letters on the Korea Question”
Ôkubo Toshimichi, “Reasons for Opposing the Korean Expedition”

Reform, Rebellion, and Revolution in China

Ebrey, et al 448-451
Zou Rong, “On Revolution”
“Tongmeng Hui Revolutionary Proclamation, 1907”
Kang Youwei and the Reform Movement

The 1911 Revolution, Nationalist China, and Cultural Revolution

Ebrey, et al 451-463
“The Movement Against Footbinding”
Lu Xun, “A Madman’s Dairy”
Kim, 3-21

Modernizing Japan: Imperial Democracy

Nationalist and Communists in China

Ebrey, et al 501-518
“Three Accounts of the New Life Movement”

World War II in Asia

Ebrey, et al 520-534
Japan at War, 61-3, 113-20, 363-6
“The Rape of Nanjing”
Film: Nanjing (2007)

US Occupation of Japan

Ebrey, et al 534-545
Mark Gayn, Japan Diary
Dower, “Making Revolution”

Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution

Ebrey, et al 546-564
Cultural Revolution Documents (22.2 through 22.5)
Japan Since 1952
Ebrey, et al 604-611
Yoshikuni Igarashi, “From the Anti-Security Treaty….”
Manwoo Lee, “How North Korea Sees Itself”

Death of Mao and the Beginning of the Reform Movement

Ebrey, et al 565-583
Communiqué of the Third Plenary
Wei Jingsheng, “The Fifth Modernization”

Reform Era China: Rural and Urban Paths

Testing the Limits: The 1989 Demonstrations
“Chairman Mao’s Ark”
“Generating Income”
“Mastering New China”


Marvin Gaye’s wife reveals how he tortured her

Janis Hunter was a mother of two in her early 20s when her longtime lover, father of her children and one of the world’s most lusted-after soul singers, Marvin Gaye, suggested an amorous liaison with another couple.

The four had been smoking weed and snorting cocaine when Gaye noticed the pair sizing her up.

“I think they want to take this party to the next phase,” he said. “A small intimate orgy is just what the doctor ordered.”

He didn’t participate but acted as ringleader, urging on the sexual proceedings between his hesitant, eager-to-please girlfriend, 17 years his junior, and the couple they had just met.

After, Gaye projected his joy at the event onto Hunter. He projected something else as well.

“You loved it, didn’t you,” he asked.

“Oh, dear, please don’t deny it. You were an animal in heat. You couldn’t get enough. This was your dream come true.”

“Not my dream, Marvin. Yours.”

The next night, when the other couple returned for more, Gaye’s enthusiasm had become something else. He told Hunter, “You go off with them if you want. I can’t stop you. I won’t try.”

She refused, the couple left and Gaye told her how he really felt about the fantasy that his prodding had made real.

“To watch purity turn to perversity is a fascinating thing,” he told her. “You were once my angel. But now you have fallen. And yes, I do admit, it is exciting to watch you fall.”

Marvin and Jan Gaye Courtesy of Jan Gaye

“After the Dance,” a memoir by Gaye’s mistress-turned-wife Jan Gaye, written with David Ritz, recalls a love affair propelled by just these sorts of mind games. Marvin Gaye’s immense, undeniable talent for singing and songwriting, and his equally impossible-to-dismiss sex appeal, were accompanied by increasingly heavy drug use — freebasing cocaine eventually did him in — and erratic moods, a constant tug of war between thrills, love, lust and terror.

Janis Hunter met Marvin Gaye when she was 17. Her mother, Barbara, was friends with Ed Townsend, Gaye’s producer, and he brought her to the studio to watch Gaye record.

Hunter recalls her first time seeing Gaye in person.

“His face expressed a gentleness that carried the same promise as [one of his songs]: that life, lifted into melody and framed by harmony, never has to be harsh,” she writes. “His sound erased all pain.”

Hunter met Gaye when she was just 17. Her mother was close friends with his producer.

At the time, Gaye was estranged from his wife, Anna Gordy, sister of Motown impresario Berry Gordy. Motown was Gaye’s record label, and both Gordys had played an outsized role in Gaye’s career. The divorce from Anna, with whom he had a son, would get ugly in the years to come.

Mutually enamored, Gaye brought Hunter to an Italian restaurant in Hollywood, where he bribed the waiter $20 to bring his underage date apricot sours.

Soon after, they made love for the first time in Gaye’s sparse one-bedroom apartment, which had a “hideous gold couch” where Gaye’s assistant, a junkie named Abe, had taken up residence.

But any surprise at his living conditions was quickly overshadowed.

“The explosive power of our sexual union was incredible,” she writes. “We made love at every opportunity, night and day. We knew every inch of each other’s bodies. We never used birth control. It was clear that Marvin wanted me pregnant — and I did nothing to prevent that.”

Soon, Hunter began to see how Gaye thrived on the emotional turmoil of those around him and learned the depth of his jealousy and possessiveness.

He tried to convince her to quit school so they could spend their days together and offered to be her educator instead.

“I can teach you everything you need to know,” he said. “I’ll be a far more loving and patient teacher than whomever the school provides.”

Being together, though, was not his only motive.

“I don’t want to share you,” he said. “There are all those strapping young high-school football players looking to love on you. They’re my competitors.”

Hunter says that Gaye clearly wanted her pregnant, and she did nothing to prevent it. Hunter would have a daughter and son with Gaye by the time she was 22. Courtesy of Jan Gaye

One day, he picked her up from school and said he needed to make a stop. He was taking her to pick up his son — at Gordy’s house.

He went inside to get the boy, and Hunter, frightened, waited in the car. Anna Gordy came outside to see the pretty young girl her husband was ditching her for.

“Anna was scary,” Hunter writes. “Her eyes burned with anger. Her eyes focused on me.”

Gaye was estranged from his wife Anna Gordy when he met Hunter. Gordy and Hunter briefly met once, and Gordy told Gaye to never bring “it” to her home again. Getty Images

Gordy “ordered” Hunter to roll down her window. She opened it just an inch.

“I just want to see what someone like you looks like,” Gordy told her, before turning to address Gaye. “Now that I’ve seen it,” she told him, “don’t ever bring it back here again.”

Hunter found herself pregnant soon after and noticed a troubling tendency in Gaye. Expressing his joy at the news, he told her, “A son. We will have a son.” Anytime they discussed their child, Gaye referred to him as a boy, and expressed a preference for such. When she mentioned the possibility of a daughter, he said, with a forced smile, “We’ll see.”

Hunter suffered a miscarriage, and Gaye consoled her by telling her, “God gives and God takes away. We praise him for his goodness and trust that next time he will bless us with a healthy boy.”

Their first child was born in September 1974 — a girl named Nona. Hunter’s first words to Gaye upon his seeing the child were, “I’m sorry.”

Gaye complimented Nona’s beauty and compared it to Hunter’s, but Hunter saw the disappointment in his eyes. Instead of joy at the birth of her first child, she spent days in tears, upset that she had disappointed the man she loved.

But if Gaye grew quickly accepting of his daughter, his attitude toward Hunter — specifically her new, just-gave-birth body — changed.

Appraising her stretch marks, he said, “Surely there is a way to rid yourself of those things.”

PBS The couple did have a son, Frankie, a little over a year later. Gaye got over his body hangups (for a while), and they settled into family life, spending their days high on coke and pot as Gaye wrote and produced new music.

George Clinton and Bernie Worrell would often drop by to shoot hoops and drop acid with Gaye. The couple were invited to watch Ike Turner in the studio, where he “carried around his coke supply in a suitcase.”

They also partied with Richard Pryor, who invited them one night “to watch bikini-clad dancers having sex with each other.”

“The evening was uncomfortable for me, but I went along with the program,” writes Hunter.

Another night at Pryor’s, the comedian “got so coked up that he hit his wife over the head with a wine bottle and called everyone at the table ‘a f—in’ whore’ except me. Marvin laughed and said I should be flattered.”

Mick Jagger and Jerry Hall invited them to Studio 54, and after meeting Ryan O’Neal at a popular LA eatery, Hunter was dismayed to find the “Love Story” actor, who was standing behind her, making an awkward and unwanted connection.

“He made his move with great subtlety, but there was no mistaking the feel of his penis against my neck,” she writes. “As he spoke with Marvin, he kept pressing ever so slightly. I didn’t know what to do or say. So I did nothing.”

She didn’t tell Gaye for fear of starting a fight, but in time, she learned the effect may have been opposite. Gaye developed a habit of steering Hunter toward other men, whether out of some perverse masochism or genuine delight.

Noting a chemistry between Hunter and Maze singer Frankie Beverly, Gaye did everything he could to set up an illicit liaison between the two. When Beverly came for a visit, Gaye not only booked him a room at a local motel but booked the adjoining room for Hunter, saying he needed her out of the house so he could focus on music.

As Hunter and Beverly smoked a joint in Hunter’s hotel room, well aware of the awkwardness, there was a loud bang at the door. It was Gaye, seemingly hoping to catch them in the act. Beverly crawled back to his room on his hands and knees, and Gaye found Hunter alone.

The couple in 1977 Getty Images

After a long, ugly and expensive legal battle, Gaye was finally divorced from Anna Gordy, and married Hunter — now Jan Gaye — in October 1977. Soon after, he was once again telling her that he loved her but was not in love with her. Jan came to wonder if Gaye saw any commitment as “a prison.”

Gaye — now almost 40 — complained to his 22-year-old wife about her sagging breasts and her stretch marks, explaining, “There’s a big difference between pleasure and excitement. As a man, I can’t help but seek excitement.”

“I was barely 22,” she writes, “yet was convinced that I had lost my youth forever.”

They had vicious fights, including one time when Gaye, behind the wheel with both kids in the car, began to swerve and threatened to “drive this thing off the road!”

Soon after, Gaye left Jan and the kids behind on a planned trip to Hawaii with his family, beginning a pattern that would repeat over the years of Gaye leaving LA and his family behind, only to implore them to join him once at his destination.

In time, torn by Gaye’s cruel treatment, Jan slept with Beverly and also hooked up with Teddy Pendergrass, Gaye’s main musical rival.

Gaye’s jealousy turned violent. One day, high on a blend of psychedelic mushrooms and cocaine, he started to talk about Jan’s betrayals and became “enraged.”

“He took a kitchen knife and put it to my throat,” she writes. “I was petrified, paralyzed. I thought it was all over.”

Gaye told her, “I’ve loved you too much. This love is killing me. I beg you to provoke me. Provoke me right now so I can take us both out of our misery.”

Gaye’s rage subsided before he could do physical harm, but for Jan, this was the final straw. She took the kids and fled.

Courtesy of Jan Gaye The next five years saw Gaye, Jan and their children embroiled in nasty back-and-forth battles, including, after Jan brought the kids to see Gaye in Hawaii, his refusing to let Frankie leave, causing Jan to not see her son for over a year.

Gaye, out of his mind on cocaine, would tell Jan that the “end days” were approaching or accuse her of sending her father or gang members to try to kill him.

Financially broken from battles with Anna and the IRS, he wound up living with his young son in “an abandoned Helms Bakery truck.”

Jan, now working odd jobs and couch-hopping with her daughter, filed for divorce in 1982. Gaye, destitute, paid no child support.

Gaye was shot to death in a brutal fight with his father on April 1, 1984.

Jan writes that it took her years to forgive herself for her own role in the insanity her life had become, but in time she learned to feel “more deeply for Marvin than ever before.”

“That I lost myself in someone else — someone as remarkable as Marvin Gaye — is no longer cause for self-condemnation.”


October 23, 1956: Hungarians Rise Up Against Soviet Rule

October 23, 2015

A destroyed T-34-85 tank sits surrounded by Hungarian citizens in Móricz Zsigmond Square. (Wikimedia Commons)

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Protests in Poland had begun earlier in the summer of 1956 before a similar uprising against the Communist government broke out in Hungary on this date in 1956. Within a few weeks of the beginning of the uprising, The Nation published a piece about the events in Hungary, “The Counter-Revolution: 10 Days That Shook the World,” by Mark Gayn, a longtime foreign-affairs correspondent, most notably for the Toronto Star. Gayn’s wife was Hungarian and, suspected of communist ties, denied entry to the United States, so she and Gayn moved to Canada. The piece shows a profound sympathy with the Hungarian revolutionaries and an abhorrence for Soviet repression.

This, then, is a time of reappraisal for everyone. Moscow has now found that its “tough” policy has backfired in Hungary, and its “soft” policy has failed dismally in Poland. Its most urgent task, therefore, is to take a fresh look at the counter-revolution now sweeping much of Eastern Europe, try to foretell its course, and decide how the Soviet Union can live side by side with it….

This, finally, is a time of reappraisal for the Western liberal who, for his inability to build his own spiritual home, has sought it in what he thought was a Socialist paradise in the East. For a generation and more, he remained loyal not to what was true but to what he imagined to be true, and sought a refuse in rationalization each time history showed him that the home he had chosen was no place for a liberal. For if he truly searched his conscience he would have found that there was no justification for Janos Kadar’s torn-out nails and the system of horror they represented. What will the liberal who hailed the original October Revolution say now of the men who revolted against that revolution? What will he do if a clerical-Fascist system arises in the ruins of Stalinism? And would he now be able to build of refuge of his own, on his own ideological grounds?

To mark The Nation’s 150th anniversary, every morning this year The Almanac will highlight something that happened that day in history and how The Nation covered it. Get The Almanac every day (or every week) by signing up to the e-mail newsletter.

Richard Kreitner Twitter Richard Kreitner is a contributing writer and the author of Break It Up: Secession, Division, and the Secret History of America's Imperfect Union. His writings are at www.richardkreitner.com.

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APA Citation

Gayn, Mark J. (1982). Shin nippon nikki : aru janaristo no iko. Tokyo : Nippon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai

MLA Citation

Gayn, Mark J. Shin nippon nikki : aru janaristo no iko / Mark Gayn translated by Kuga Toyoo Nippon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai Tokyo 1982

Australian/Harvard Citation

Gayn, Mark J. 1982, Shin nippon nikki : aru janaristo no iko / Mark Gayn translated by Kuga Toyoo Nippon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai Tokyo

Wikipedia Citation
Shin nippon nikki : aru janaristo no iko / Mark Gayn translated by Kuga Toyoo
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041 1 |ajpn |heng
043 |aa-ja---
100 1 |aGayn, Mark J |d1909-1981.
245 1 0 |aShin nippon nikki : |baru janaristo no iko / |cMark Gayn translated by Kuga Toyoo.
260 |aTokyo : |bNippon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, |c1982.
300 |a353 p. , [5] leaves of plates : |bill.(some col.), ports. |c20 cm.
651 0 |aJapan |xHistory |yAllied occupation, 1945-1952.
651 0 |aJapan |xPolitics and government |y1945-
984 |aanl |i- |cOJ 4140.9 6048

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Red China Is Jew China: The Disturbing Origins of Chinese Communism And The Deepening Chinese-‘Israeli’ Ties Of Today

You wouldn’t know it upon first glance, but China and the Jews are chum-chum-chummy. It’s a historical relationship that goes back to the very inception of Chinese communism. In a July 9th, 2012 piece entitled “A Jew In Mao’s China” by Laura Goldman for “The Schmooze” of the Jewish Daily Forward, she revealed, “In fact, 85 to 90% of the foreigners helping the Chinese at the time of the Communist takeover were Jewish. This included the daughter of the founder of the brokerage firm Goldman Sachs, who left the comfort of her Park Avenue home to assist the Chinese.” In conjunction with these startling anomalies, the US ZOG had a base in Tianjin from 1945-1947. Tianjin was home to a sizable Jewish community, particularly Russian communists. It was from the Tianjin base that the Dixie Mission of the OSS trained, financed and armed none other than Mao Zedong and his merry band of “revolutionaries” to fight the Japanese–which, contrary to popular opinion, weren’t “imperialists” nor “warmongers” but rather, liberators of Brown and Yellow peoples colonized by the ZOGs of Europe. That however is another story for another time.

The OSS itself was a den of Jewish and Judeophilic intriguers, set up for the sole purpose of infiltrating and ultimately destroying Germany and Japan. There were a multitude of Jewish operatives who were brought into the fold strictly because of their Jewishness and connections with businessmen and bankers in Europe who also sought the downfall of the Axis Powers. Leading this effort in organizing, coordination and recruitment was Nahum Amber Bernstein, the lawyer for the genocidal Jewish Agency and preeminent funder of the Haganah. Another key OSS operative was the notorious Major Louis Mortimer Bloomfield, a wealthy Montreal-based lawyer who was also connected to the Haganah as well as a main player in Permindex, the shadowy Jewish-dominated corporation that helped murder President John F. Kennedy. These are the types who the Chinese communists took assistance from. No dignity whatsoever as just a few decades earlier, the Sassoon family, known as the Iraqi-Jewish Rothschilds, crippled large swathes of the Chinese population with opium addiction. All of this, as well as what is about to be discussed, is extremely relevant as the Chinese-‘Israeli’ relationship of today unfolds at an increasingly expansive rate. Now allow us to delve into Red China’s Jewish patrons. And founders.

Grigori Naumovich Voitinsky (birthname: Zarkhin) – Russian Jew. One of the founders of Soviet Sinology. Handler of Chen Duxiu. Cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party, which he and his colleagues established in 1920. Bolshevik. The process of forming the party in its nascent stages can mostly be attributed to his strategic thinking. Bolshevik propaganda was disseminated through the Shanghai Chronicle–which he managed. He can indeed be identified as the godfather of Chinese communism as well as other branches of communism in the Asian world.

Manfred Stern aka Emilio Kléber aka Lazar Stern aka Moishe Stern aka Mark Zilbert aka General Kleber – Ukrainian Jew. Leader of the International Brigade in Spain. Bolshevik. Helped put down the anti-Soviet rebellion in Mongolia. Became the GRU’s chief spy in the US with his missions centered around stealing American military secrets. Would become the chief military advisor in the Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet, with Mao, Zhu De and others reporting directly to him.

Solomon Adler – Jew with origins from Karelitz, Belarus. US Treasury Department economist, Treasury rep in China during WW2. Pegged as a Soviet spy by Whittaker Chambers, returned to China to spearhead translating Mao’s works into English. Was also with the International Liason Department, a vital organ of the CCP whose functions included foreign intelligence.

Henry Kissinger – Among history’s worst human beings. Involved in a slew of genocides, massacres, war crimes, destabilizations and other acts of psychopathy–particularly in Asia. Masterminded the opening of trade with China and sold out America’s manufacturing power to the Chinese. Grandsire of transmogrifying China into a commie state to a cappy state.

Jakob Rosenfeld aka General Luo – Austro-Hungarian Jew. Minister of Health in Mao’s provisional government and top Mao advisor. Served in the Chinese Communist Force from 1941 on and participated in the Chinese Communist Force’s march on Beijing. Settled in the Entity after the Communist takeover of China was complete. Statue of him was erected in his honor in Junan county, Shandong and a massive exhibit was named after him in 2006 in Beijing’s National Museum of China.

Sidney Rittenberg – Charleston, South Carolina Jew. Descendant of slave-owners. First American to join the CCP. Close advisor to Mao, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and other high-up CCP leaders. Trusted translator of the Chinese Communist “revolution”. Married into the Chinese family of Wang Yulin. Cultural Revolution supporter. Played a key role in transmitting Chinese Communist propaganda for Xinhua and Radio Peking. Ascended to the head of the Broadcast Administration – i.e. propaganda production – in an unprecedented move that nobody ever thought could be held by a foreigner. But in Communist China of course, Jews weren’t foreigners but “comrades”. Returned to the United Snakes of IsraHELL in 1980 to found Rittenberg & Associates, a company which became a vital go-between for American corporations and China.

Sidney Shapiro aka Sha Boli – New York Ashkenazi Jew. Member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Council. Head of Communist China’s propaganda apparatus. Top translator, writer and publisher of works on China, as well as an actor in Chinese films focused on American villainy. Conducted extensive research into Jews in China and got the works translated into Hebrew and published in the Entity. In December of 2014, the China International Publishing Group announced it was establishing a Sidney Shapiro Research Center in his honor to investigate model criteria for translation between Chinese and English.

Israel Epstein – Polish Jew. Anti-Japanese spy. His father was a Bolshevik agitator. Member of the NKVD’s China divison. Mao’s Minister of Finance/Appropriations. Honored by Mao, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Member of the CCP and editor of China Reconstructs/China Today. His wife was a top contributor to one of the most widely used Chinese-English dictionaries published in China.

Frank Coe – Richmond, Virginia Jew. Treasury Department official from 1934-1939 who worked with the Silvermaster spy ring that featured Harry Dexter White at the head of Operation Snow–the precusor to Pearl Harbor. Friend and co-conspirator of Solomon Adler. Key player in Mao’s Great Leap Forward.

Robert Lawrence Kuhn – Jewish investment banker, Kissingerite and international corporate strategist with an “expertise” in China. He’s been advising the CCP on economic policy, science, technology, media, culture, US-Chinese relations and international communications for over 20 years.

Mikhail Borodin aka Mikhail Gruzenberg – Jew from Vitebsk, Belarus. Top lieutenant of Lenin. After the Bolshevik takeover, he engaged in spying activities in the UK ZOG, US ZOG and Mexico. Then led a group of Soviet advisors in Guangzhou. He negotiated the First United Front between the Chinese Nationalist Party of Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese Communist Party. Under his guidance, both parties reorganized on Leninist dogma and organized training institutes for mass organizations, such as the Peasant Training Institute, where none other than a young Mao served, and the Whampoa Military Academy. He arranged shipments of Soviet arms and kept a balance between the radical communists and the “bourgeios” Nationalists.

David Crook – Staunchly anti-Russian Jewish supremacist from the UK. Fought with many other Jews in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. Got recruited by the NKVD as a result of his actions in Spain and was sent to China where he also doubled as a British intelligence agent, working with communists against the Japanese. An architect of China’s foreign service and active in the CCP’s theft of private property, aka “land reform”.

Adolph Abramovich Joffe – Turkic Karaite Jew from Crimea. From a very wealthy family. Associate of Trotsky and Hungarian-Austrian Jew Alfred Adler. Ally and supporter of Lenin. Chairman of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee that overthrew the Russian Provisional Government. Ambassador to China, signing agreements with Sun Yat-Sen and overseeing the distribution of aid and weapons to the Kuomintang as well as cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communists.

Richard Frey aka Richard Stein – Jew from Vienna, Austria. Arrived in China in 1939 and joined in operations against the Japanese. Member of the CCP and took part in the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Yan’an – the political and military base of the Communist Party of China– as a guest auditor. Pioneer of Integrative Medicine Treatment in China. He founded and managed the first computer database for the medical information center in Beijing. Chairman of the Information Institute and curator of the Medical Academy of Sciences of China. Helped build relations between Austria and China. Honored by Hu Jintao.

Shafick George Hatem aka Ma Haide – Syrian-Lebanese Jew often mistaken as a Maronite who lived in both upstate NY and Lawrence, MA. First traveled to China’s Shanghai with Jewish colleagues (and communist agents) Lazar Katz and Robert Levinson. Traveled to communist HQ in Bao’an (modern-day Zhidan) to directly assist Mao’s troops and personally examine Mao to dispel rumors of Mao’s impending death via a mysterious disease. Chief organizer for recruiting foreign medical personnel to treat Chinese communist forces fighting Japan in northern China. Became a public health official in China after the communist victory in 1949 and holds the distinction of becoming the first foreigner granted Chinese citizenship. Known as the “American Physician Savior to Modern China”.

Hans Shippe aka Morzec Grzyb – Jew from Krakow, Poland. Germany Communist Party member. Soviet journo. Joined Chinese communists in Guangzhou as a translator and interviewer, spreading interviews with top CCP leaders including Mao. Associate of Shafick George Hatem (Ma Haide). First Jew to fall on the battlefield in China’s war against Japan. Monument erected in his honor by Chinese communists in 1942 in Shandong province.

Ruth Weiss aka Wei Lushi – Jew from Vienna, Austria. Said to be the last surviving European eyewitness of the Chinese communist takeover of China. Top educator at the Jewish School in Shanghai, the School of the Chinese Committee of Intellectual Cooperation and West China Union University. Did propaganda work for the Publishing House for Foreign Literature and financial work at the China Welfare Fund. Named one of eleven foreign experts by the Communist Party of China that were part of membership of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1983.

Rewi Alley – Crypto-Jew, homosexual and probable pedophile from New Zealand. Associate of Ma Haide, Ruth Weiss and Hans Shippe. Became a secret member of the CCP in the late 20s/early 30s and by 1932, was carrying out mission after mission for the communists. Set up the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives to bring in foreign and local high-born money for the war against Japan. Credited with introducing “guerilla industry” to China. Became a top propagandist for the new regime, writing works praising the CCP and its actions nationwide, including the Great Leap Forward. Bragged of his “familial” ties to the CCP’s top brass, including Mao. Rewi Alley Memorial Hall and Research Centre at Lanzhou City University College erected in his honor in 2017. Also honored with the Queen’s Service Order by the New Zealand ZOG and was instrumental in forging strong bonds between Beijing and Wellington.

Betty Chandler aka Chen Bidi – Jew from Manitoba, Canada. Close to Israel Epstein and Sidney Shapiro. CPPCC member. Active participant in the management of Red China’s state affairs. Worked as a medical professional on the front lines against Japan as well as a propagandist, disseminating pictures of alleged Japanese atrocities to US papers as a means of defending the Chinese communist narrative. Carried on the hasbara work at the Publishing House for Foreign Literature, serving as an English-language lecturer.

Hans Miller – German Jew. Came to China in 1939 and held the title of director in at least four different hospitals. CCP and CPPCC member. Trained with Mao and participated in fighting against the Japanese. Helped develop medical science in China and was appointed VP of Beijing Medical University. His contributions during the war against Japan were said to have been critical, especially in Yanan.

Gunther Stein – German Jew. Soviet spy and Red China spy part of the Sorge spy ring. Used his journalist credentials with AP, the Manchester Guardian and the Christian Science Monitor to mask his clandestine activities and deflect attention off the fact he was disseminating propaganda on behalf of the communists. Wrote the book “Challenge of Red China”, celebrating the defeat of Japan and new regime of communism. Today this book is touted by none other than the Rothschild-bankrolled CFR.

Philip Jacob Jaffe – Ukrainian-Russian Jew from NYC’s Lower East Side. Co-founder and policymaker of the Committee for a Democratic Far East Policy (CDFEP). Associate of Israel Epstein and Gunther Stein, who were both CDFEP members. Function of the CDFEP was to instill communism deep into Chinese society through anti-Japanese propaganda. Met with Mao as early as 1924. Published the journal “Amerasia” with money from the Judeophilic Vanderbilts. Amerasia was raided by government authorities for publishing classified materials and Jaffe along with his colleagues and his presumed source, a Jewish Office of Naval Intelligence officer named Andrew Roth, were arrested for espionage. Was a friend and financier of Thomas Arthur Bisson aka T.A. Bisson aka Arthur, a propagandist for Chinese communism in America, suspected Soviet spy who collaborated with Jewish agent of the Soviets Joseph Bernstein, and prolific anti-Japanese writer.

Eva Sandberg aka Eva Xiao – Polish-German Jew. Soviet citizen and spy. Known as the “Only White Western Woman in Yanan”, she married Chinese poet Xiao San, an old classmate and boyhood friend of Mao. She helped Xiao run the editorial department at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and disseminate communist thought. Was also just one of three Soviet women in all of Red China.

Ursula Kuczynski aka Ruth Werner aka Ursula Beurton aka Ursula Hamburger aka Sonja (codename) – Prussian-German-Polish Jew. Her father, Robert Rene, was a well-known and wealthy economist. Her Yahoudling husband, Rudolf Hamburger, was an architect of the German Communist Party and also a Soviet spy who worked with her in China. Infiltrated MI5, the Royal Air Force and the OSS. Eulogized by the Jew York Times as a “Colorful and Daring Soviet Spy”. Attained the rank of Colonel within the Soviet military. Awarded the Order of the Red Banner for her espionage in China. She ran a spy ring in Shanghai and her missions prominently featured the interception of Japanese communications and sabotage of Japanese military positions in Manchuria. She stored weapons and secured bomb-making materials for Chinese communist guerillas. It is said that Japan would not have pulled out of Manchuria had it not been for her work. Collaborated with the Rosenbergs, David Greenglass, Harry Gold and Klaus Fuchs to get classified nuclear armaments info to the Soviet Union and is credited particularly with being responsible for ***the transmission*** that started the Soviet nuke program. Fuchs, for the record, was recruited into services for the Soviets by none other than her brother Jurgen Kuczynski, an internationally renowned economist.

Michael Menachem Greenberg – Polish-Romanian-British Jew. Managing editor of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) publication, “Pacific Affairs”, where he disseminated a heavily anti-Japanese line. He became a China specialist at the Board of Economic Warfare and an assistant to the agency’s head, Lauchlin Currie–who was revealed to be a Soviet spy connected to Jew Harry Dexter White and the Silvermaster espionage ring. Later worked as a Foreign Affairs Economist in the Administrative Division, Enemy Branch, of the Foreign Economic Administration. His tasks involved finding ways to economically squeeze Japan. Revealed to be a spy for Red China by the investigations of Joseph McCarthy, whose “red-baiting” wasn’t so immersed in paranoia, megalomania and bigotry as liberals (mainly Jews) would have the world believe. Ultimately escaped prosecution and imprisonment and returned to England where he wrote the hasbara book, “British Trade and The Opening of China”, attacking the British for colonially exploiting China in the Opium Wars but deliberately obfuscating the role of the actual opium traders–the aforementioned Mizrahi Jewish Rothschild lieutenants, the Sassoons.

Mark Gayn aka Mark Julius Ginsbourg – Russian-American-Canadian Jew born in Manchuria. Schooled in Russia’s Vladivostock, China’s Shanghai, California’s Claremont and New York’s New York City (Columbia). Writer/journalist for the Jew York Times, Washington Post, Time, Toronto Star and Newsweek. Worked for and passed info to the spy den masquerading as a journalism magazine of Philip Jacob Jaffe, Amerasia. His home was raided by the FBI and 60 classified documents were found. Declassified FBI files reveal that he was Soviet/Chinese spy who had stolen these OSS documents, which related to Chiang Kai-shek’s battle plans against Mao. The theft of this info proved crucial in the Chinese Communist Force defeating Chiang Kai-shek and attaining power. Inexplicably, despite the arrest following the raid on his home, he was let go under the pretext that he would serve as a double agent for America but this never materialized. More probably however, it was Jewish Lobby pressure and his importance to the Maoist cause that procured his release. Said to have obtained information that JFK was going to be assassinated–significant considered the Jewish-‘Israeli’ role in that crime. Traveled to the Soviet Union every year between 1964-1970, not to mention multiple visits to China and was able to get two sit-downs with Mao–more than likely because of his spying almost 20 years earlier.

In conclusion–and a damn clear conclusion at that–there’d be no communism in China without the contributions of these Jews and many others still to be discovered and documented. From the subversive efforts of Gayn and Kuczynski, to the state-building efforts of Epstein, Chandler and Shapiro, to the primordial efforts of Stern and the godfather of them all, Voitinsky. Also, China would not have become the world power it is today if Henry Kissinger hadn’t opened up the doors to trade. Moving further forward, as discussed at the start, we see China becoming disturbingly more ingratiated with the ‘Israeli’ entity in the fields of military, intelligence and technology cooperation as time goes on–no doubt an extension of Jewish-Chinese familiarity going back almost a century.

Jonathan Pollard, the Jewish-Zionist traitor and most destructive spy in American history, gave classified intel to ‘Israel’ which then sold the bombshells to Beijing and he passed stolen secrets to China directly too–at the behest of his “Tel Aviv” handlers and to help his wife’s business plans. ‘Israel’ and China worked hand-in-glove during Operation Cyclone to bring down the very Soviet Union that made Chinese governance “red” in the first place! In 1982, ‘Israel’ provided the Chinese with advanced missile tech and upgraded their tank fleet. This turned into a full-blown defense relationship that prospered after the events at Tiananmen Square.

As it stands at this moment, ‘Israeli’-Chinese bilateral trade has reached a whopping $13 billion, about 260 times what it was in 1992when it was just starting to take off due to the military ties. Chinese students are flocking to the usurping Zionist entity in record numbers for studies, especially technology, which means, whether they know it or not–though you better believe that the ‘Israelis’ know it for certain–they’re being tapped as Talpiot fifth columnists when they return to China. There are extensive, regular direct flights operating between “Tel Aviv” and Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Hong Kong–which aeronautically links the Zio-Tumor to major cites of China’s north, south, east and west.

China’s explicit backing of the Saudi war on Yemen–a Zionist war through and through–is another blatant display of Chinese-‘Israeli’ collusion. Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan is currently visiting the illegitimate ‘Israeli’ regime and he said unequivocally that “cooperation” between the two “needs” to be “taken to the next level”. Baby-killer Netanyahu called China “very important”for the Jewish gangster “state”. We see their words coming to fruition already as China has been given control of two ‘Israeli’ ports, including occupied Haifa where the ‘Israeli’ enemy maintains its nuclear submarine array –signifying that the genocidal Halakhic-Talmudic regime sees Beijing and its “One Belt, One Road Initiative” as vitally integral elements of its security along with its hegemonic system.

This isn’t to say that there aren’t nuances. Mao locked up several of the Jews mentioned in this piece for overstepping their limits and he went against the advice of those who still curried favor with him when he decided to provide arms and military training to Palestine’s PFLP–which ended due to pressure from who else but war criminal Henry Kissinger. He always seemed to be teetering on standing with the peasantry from which he came and the Jewish-led international hegemonists who sought to turn China into “theirs” since they couldn’t break it with the opium pandemic. And he always sold out to the latter.

But fighting back against imperialist meddling with ‘Israeli’ technology and military support doesn’t make you an anti-imperialist superstar nor will it endear you to millions of Muhammadi-Husseini revolutionaries seeking to liquidate the transhistorical framework of oppression led by Islam’s greatest enemy. Hell, it doesn’t endear you to revolutionaries PERIOD–Muslim or otherwise. What it makes you is a lollygagging fool. Because ‘Israel’ is playing every side while it further cements its global dominance and paves the way for its Dajjalic false messiah–we see it already with the previously noted Uyghurs. ‘Israel’ will discard China to the curb just like it does with all other Shabbos Goyim. So this piece, apart from its fact-finding nature, is also meant to serve as a warning to our Chinese brethren who have Anti-Parasitic vision and consciousness, not to mention a strong sense of patriotism. Get out while you still can before ‘Israel’ sucks you dry.

First it was Bolshevism. Now it’s Zionism. And in both instances, Red China means Jew China and the named-names evidence… the hard, direct, named-names evidence… proves it beyond all shreds of skepticism. The only question that remains now is… Will a nation with a history as vibrant as China allow itself to be nothing but a ZOG in service of a “nation” as accursed as the cancer calling itself ‘Israel’? Or will it reassert its civilizational glory as well as its place in the pantheon of Global South Resistance and disassociate itself from the Zio-Tumor? With Chinese tycoons like Jack Ma enamored with ‘Israel’ and China’s political leadership all the way up to Xi Jinping pushing to merge China and ‘Israel’ closer and closer centrally when it comes to technology, it doesn’t look good to say the least. God help the Chinese people. God help us all. And may God damn World Zionism and all of its tribalist agents as well as its collaborators past and present to the Naar.


Watch the video: Mark and his funny stories for children with a new friend. (January 2022).