Nationalist Defeat in Manchuria - History

On October 30th Nationalist troops were defeated in Manchuria after the Communists captured the city of Mukden. Three hundred thousand Nationalist troops were captured. The defeat in Mukden marked the beginning of the end for the Nationalist forces.

Is it impossible to accurately simulate a nationalist defeat in China?

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Lt. General



Me too. I'd like to see post Asia more defined through the civil war. It needs lots of work for the People's Republic of China to emerge victorious, especially on Historical if Japan fails in China.

The Pacific war needs a drastic overhaul too.

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Historians often view Japanese imperialism in exceptional terms. Race and culture set Japan apart from the imperial powers of the West its drive for world power challenged four centuries of European dominance in Asia. Footnote 1 And yet, the Japanese case has much in common with other empires of modern times. In particular, the commonalities of the three Axis empires offer a number of intriguing parallels. All three considered themselves outsiders, who embarked on empire-building during the hyper-imperialism of the late nineteenth century and entered an inter-state system where established powers such as Britain and France appeared to hold the advantage. The shared perception that they had started out behind in the scramble for territory in Africa and Asia contributed to ways in which all three found fault with the existing economic and legal framework of imperialism, and particularly the institutions created after the First World War. By the 1920s, the language of ‘have not’ and ‘proletarian’ nations began to appear in German, Italian, and Japanese discussions of the world order. Such discussions defended their expansionisms as a matter of national survival and called for an equal share of world resources, denouncing as hypocrisy efforts to obstruct them while leaving in place the vast colonial empires established under the old order. From the mid 1930s, diplomatic and intellectual ties between the three Axis powers built on this foundation, and provided space for exchange of the norms and forms of what might be called ‘fascist imperialism’.

This article explores the concept of fascist imperialism as it applies to the case of Japan. While scholars have examined the politics and culture of fascism in metropolitan Japan, there is virtually no literature on fascist imperialism. Indeed, the consensus term is ‘wartime empire’ and the dominant framework is of an empire mobilized for total war. Footnote 2 One of my goals is to think through what this concept might mean and what the Japanese case might contribute to a definition of fascist imperialism. Detailed comparison with Germany and Italy is beyond the scope of this article rather, I attempt to build a definition of fascism around four core elements drawn from the Japanese case.

The first was the ideology of Asianism that envisioned Japanese leadership over a regional movement of anti-colonial nationalisms. Asianism sought a regional order that rejected Western ideals of Soviet internationalism and British liberal imperialism and aimed to drive the West out of Asia. Japan’s claim to be shepherding the creation of an independent, multi-racial state in Manchukuo was part of this effort, as was the articulation of a political ideology for Manchukuo – what I call Asian-style fascism – that positioned itself as a third way between democracy and socialism. Thus, the first characteristic of fascist imperialism is Asianism as a challenge to and rejection of the Western-dominated geopolitical world order.

The second element was hyper-militarism, a phenomenon that connected the inside and outside of fascist imperialism. Beginning with the Manchurian Incident of 1931, Japan’s military became an instrument of radicalism and terror both at home and in the empire. The army seized control of Japan’s sphere of influence in China from civilian power holders such as the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) and the Kwantung Governor-General, and took over the government in Tokyo by sidelining civilians and excluding party politicians from the central organs of state control. Once in power, the army took the lead in green-lighting further aggressive military expansionism, and increasingly suspended political liberties in the name of putting society on a total war footing. In this sense, hyper-militarism went well beyond projects of military-led modernization and military imperialism pursued since the late nineteenth century and constituted a new celebration of military action and the aesthetics of violence that was distinctly fascist.

The third feature of fascist imperialism was red peril. Anti-communism suffused army thinking throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and propelled the creation of a police state targeting communist intellectuals, politicians, and labour activists within the archipelago, as well as communist nationalists in the empire. Red peril thinking became weaponized through military operations to contain the Soviet Union, from the Siberian Intervention after the First World War to the undeclared war of the late 1930s. The mutually reinforcing connections between anti-communist foreign policy, military strategy, and governmentality emerged precisely because the threat of communism to the Japanese state spanned global and regional politics: colonial politics in Korea, Taiwan, and China, as well as domestic politics. As I will argue, fascist alliances and fascist governmentality emerged as the answer to that threat.

The fourth aspect of fascism in Japan was what I call radical statism. What Asianism, hyper-militarism, and red peril thinking all held in common was the turn to the state as the agent of salvation. Fascism at home and in the empire made the state into the spear tip and the staging ground of radical reform. Driving the embrace of radical state solutions were events both on the world stage and in the domestic arena. The rise of anti-colonial nationalism in Asia, the breakdown of Great Power cooperation in China, and the global economic crisis of the early 1930s exposed the inadequacy of existing strategies and institutions. Social unrest and economic paralysis at home cried out for bold and immediate solutions. These concatenating crises convinced a broad range of stakeholders to put their faith in the state and in radical solutions from the fascist toolkit. Like the other three dimensions of fascism in Japan, radical statism intensified in the process of territorial expansion from 1931 to 1945. As I will argue, all four elements of fascist imperialism linked transformations across the nation-state-empire.

‘Fascism’ is a vexed and emotional word, especially in Asia, where disputes over the use or misuse of the term have evaded consensus for nearly a century. We have arrived at a moment where debates about the definition of fascism have again gained currency, driven by the proliferation of right-wing nationalist movements across the globe. The widespread trafficking in neo-fascist thought and policy press us to rethink what the original fascist moment represented. The question of whether Japan was fascist is a fraught one, which has often foundered on the substantive differences between political regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan. While much of the earlier literature on comparative fascism looked at politics, states, and political leadership, the starting point of this special issue is to re-engage with the issue of comparability upon the site of empire. By expanding the scope of our investigative terrain, the problem of fascist imperialism brings new material to the table and opens up possibilities for theorizing the structures and dynamics of fascism. In this spirit, my article will examine Japan’s occupation of Northeast China from 1931 to 1945 to ground a thought experiment for a new understanding of fascism.


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How did the Chinese Communists win the Civil War?

Following the Second World War the Communists in China, who had been fighting in coalition against the Japanese, held roughly 1/4 of Chinese land and 1/3 of the population. The Communists had a good relationship with the Soviet union and through this were able to secure the arms that had been confiscated from Japanese troops at the end of the war and aid from the Soviet Union. This was a reasonably strong position from which to re-open the Civil War.

This gave the communist forces a powerful military base from which to launch attacks. They were though heavily outnumbered and the Nationalist government received support from the US. How then, were the Communists able to seize control?

Communist Policy was critical in gaining the support of the peasants. They promised Land Reforms that would give the peasants land. This was hugely popular amongst the impoverished peasant class in China and led to huge numbers of peasants volunteering for service during the Civil War: 5.4 million were mobilised for the Huaihai Campaign alone.

Tactically the Communists were very astute. In 1947 they were well aware that their main force was outnumbered and outgunned. Following the Long March, they adapted tactics and trained for a new method of fighting. They adopted a policy of not attacking the main Nationalist Forces and were willing to give up land in order to preserve the bulk of their fighting force. In doing so they could pick off weaker targets, cause logistical and supply problems for the Nationalists whilst continuing to build up their own support within the peasant classes. The Long March was partly responsible for this success. This was aided by the massive rise in unemployment in Nationalist controlled areas at this time.

In June of 1947 the communists launched a counter offensive against the Nationalist army. They successfully defeated the KMT New First Army. Now the communists had a large array of tanks and heavy artillery at their disposal. They put this to good use in 1948. They launched an attack south of the Great Wall that cut off Nationalist troops from their supply bases in Xi’an. They then secured the South East Central section of China, from where they were able to launch offensives against the remaining Nationalist armies. By the end of January 1949 most of China was in the hands of the Communists. Over a million men of the Nationalist army had been killed and the nationalist Capital city, Nangjin, was under threat. By April the Nationalist government had fled to Taiwan. The Communists had defeated them.

What were the main reasons for this victory?

  • Leadership. The Communists had a well thought out plan and knew how to gain the support of the people.
  • Tactics. The Nationalist tactics played into the hands of the Communists who were able to make the most of the position they found themselves in at the end of the Second World War.
  • Support from outside. The Nationalists received funding from America but didn’t put this to particularly good effect: much of the weaponary being captured by the Communists at a relatively early stage. The Communists received military aid and guidance from the Soviet Union which was measured, realistic and effective.
  • The People. In most parts of China the Communists were able to win the suport of the majority of the local population. This was a massive advantage when advancing into territories.

Source: Mao speech, August 1945

During the past eight years the people and army of our Liberated Areas, receiving no aid whatsoever from outside and relying solely on their own efforts, liberated vast territories and resisted and pinned down the bulk of the Japanese invading forces and practically all the puppet troops. Only by our determined resistance and heroic struggle were the 200 million people in the Great Rear Area [5] saved from being trampled underfoot by the Japanese aggressors and the regions inhabited by these 200 million people saved from Japanese occupation. Chiang Kai-shek hid on Mount Omei with guards in front of him — the guards were the Liberated Areas, the people and army of the Liberated Areas. In defending the 200 million people of the Great Rear Area, we protected this “generalissimo” as well and gave him both the time and the space to sit around waiting for victory with folded arms. Time — eight years one month. Space — an area inhabited by 200 million people. These conditions we provided for him. But for us, he could not have stood by looking on. Is the “generalissimo” grateful to us, then? No, not he! This fellow has never known what it is to be grateful. How did Chiang Kai-shek climb to power? By the Northern Expedition, [6] by the first period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, [7] by the support given him by the people, who had not yet seen through him. Once in power, Chiang Kai-shek, far from being grateful to the people, knocked them down and plunged them into the bloodbath of ten years of civil war. You comrades are familiar with this segment of history. During the present War of Resistance the Chinese people again defended him. This war is now ending in victory and Japan is on the point of surrender, but he is not at all grateful to the people. On the contrary, thumbing through the records of 1927, he wants to act in the same old way.[8] He says there has never been any “civil war” in China, only “bandit suppression”. Whatever he likes to call it, the fact is he wants to start a civil war against the people, he wants to slaughter the people.

Source: Report made by Mao, 25th December, 1947

In seventeen months of fighting (from July 1946 to November 1947 December figures are not yet available), we killed, wounded and captured 1,690,000 of Chiang Kai-shek’s regular and irregular troops — 640,000 killed and wounded and 1,050,000 captured. Thus we were able to beat back Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive, preserve the main territories of the Liberated Areas and go over to the offensive. Speaking from the military aspect, we were able to do this because we employed the correct strategy. Our principles of operation are:

1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.

2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first take big cities later.

3. Make wiping out the enemy’s effective strength our main objective do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy’s effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we are absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.

5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

6. Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).

7. Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.

8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Seize at opportune moments all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them.

9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army’s main sources of manpower and matériel are at the front.

10. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should in general not be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

Global Security – The Chinese Civil war. Detailed page.

Suite 101 – article about the war between the Nationalists and the Communists.

Interactive Map – showing the way in which the Chinese Civil War developed.

US Military Academy – website dedicated to the campaigns of the Chinese Civil War

Experience Festival – a selection of links to articles about the Chinese Civil War.

News Player – a number of vidoes showing footage of eventas during the Chinese Civil War.

Why Did Japan Invade Manchuria in 1931?

Historians agree Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 for two main reasons: ideology and natural resources. Nationalist leaders in Japan desired to unite all of Asia under one emperor, an ideology known as hakkô ichiu.

In order to execute this ideology and grow its military, Japan needed more natural resources to increase its industrial productivity and strength. Japan did not want to be reliant on other countries for these resources, so Japanese leaders ordered the invasion of resource-rich colonies. Leaders soon decided on invading neighboring China, specifically the province of Manchuria.

China was already weak due to civil war with Communists. Due to the Nationalist Chinese forces preoccupation with these Communists, they did not resist the invading Japanese. Instead, China turned to the League of Nations for help. The League of Nations set deadlines for Japan to withdraw, which Japan ignored. The United States failed to retaliate with any military or economic action. When Japan formed the puppet state Manchukuo in Manchuria, both the United States and the League of Nations refused to recognize it as a legitimate state causing Japan to withdraw from the League in 1933. That same year, Japan invaded and took control of Jehol a neighboring province. In 1939, the United States finally started to challenge Japan's actions in China by pulling out of trade agreements.


Contribution to Victory [ edit | edit source ]

  • Holding Japanese army for 8 years, thus Japanese abandoned the invasion possibility to USSR.
  • Eliminate over 2,000,000 Japanese soldiers.
  • Crippled Japanese's reinforcement to Pacific

Dilemma in Reality [ edit | edit source ]

  • Lost the Civil War in1946-1949.Since than,stay in Taiwan (Losing over 99% territory)
  • "China" now means "People Republic of China(PRC)"
  • PRC trying to take over "the nation defender in WWII's efforts"
  • No Longer represent to China. Being forgotten by world.
  • Some people in Taiwan still Longing for Japanese Occupation era, they don't agree with ROC at all. They even tried to Whitewashing Japanese's war crime in 1920-1945.

Historians rethink key Soviet role in Japan defeat

FILE - In this Thursday, Aug. 23, 1945 file picture, a Soviet Red Army soldier peers over the edge of a Japanese fort, at an unknown location in China. On Aug. 8, 1945, the Soviet Union officially declared war on Japan and invaded Japanese-occupied Manchuria in northeastern China. In recent years some historians have argued that a Soviet surprise attack on the Japanese army occupying eastern Asia served as effectively as _ or possibly more than _ the atomic bombs in ending the war. (AP Photo/File)

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As the United States dropped its atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, 1.6 million Soviet troops launched a surprise attack on the Japanese army occupying eastern Asia. Within days, Emperor Hirohito's million-man army in the region had collapsed.

It was a momentous turn on the Pacific battleground of World War II, yet one that would be largely eclipsed in the history books by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the same week 65 years ago. But in recent years some historians have argued that the Soviet action served as effectively as -- or possibly more than -- the A-bombs in ending the war.

Now a new history by a professor at University of California, Santa Barbara seeks to reinforce that view, arguing that fear of Soviet invasion persuaded the Japanese to opt for surrender to the Americans, who they believed would treat them more generously than the Soviets.

Japan's forces in northeast Asia first tangled with the Russians in 1939 when the Japanese army tried to invade Mongolia. Their crushing defeat at the battle of Khalkin Gol induced Tokyo to sign a neutrality pact that kept the USSR out of the Pacific war.

Tokyo turned its focus to confronting U.S., British and Dutch forces instead, which led to the Pearl Harbor attack on Dec. 7, 1941.

But following the German surrender on May 8, 1945, and having suffered a string of defeats in the Philippines, Okinawa and Iwo Jima, Japan turned to Moscow to mediate an end to the Pacific war.

However, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had already secretly promised Washington and London that he would attack Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. He thus ignored Tokyo's plea, and mobilized more than a million troops along Manchuria's border.

Operation August Storm was launched Aug. 9, 1945, as the Nagasaki bomb was dropped, and would claim the lives of 84,000 Japanese and 12,000 Soviet soldiers in two weeks of fighting. The Soviets ended up just 50 kilometers (30 miles) from Japan's main northern island, Hokkaido.

"The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation," said Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, whose recently published "Racing the Enemy" examines the conclusion of the Pacific war and is based on recently declassified Soviet archives as well as U.S. and Japanese documents..

"The emperor and the peace party (within the government) hastened to end the war expecting that the Americans would deal with Japan more generously than the Soviets," Hasegawa, a Russian-speaking American scholar, said in an interview.

Despite the death toll from the atomic bombings -- 140,000 in Hiroshima, 80,000 in Nagasaki the Imperial Military Command believed it could hold out against an Allied invasion if it retained control of Manchuria and Korea, which provided Japan with the resources for war, according to Hasegawa and Terry Charman, a historian of World War II at London's Imperial War Museum.

"The Soviet attack changed all that," Charman said. "The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now, and in that sense August Storm did have a greater effect on the Japanese decision to surrender than the dropping of the A-bombs."

In the U.S., the bombings are still widely seen as a decision of last resort against an enemy that appeared determined to fight to the death. President Harry S. Truman and U.S. military leaders believed an invasion of Japan would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives.

American historian Richard B. Frank has argued that as terrible as the atomic bombs were, they saved hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and millions of Japanese troops and civilians who would have perished if the conflict had gone on until 1946.

"In the famous words of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, (the bombs) were the 'least abhorrent choice' of a dreadful array of option facing American leaders," he said in an interview. "Alternatives to the atomic bombs carried no guarantee as to when they would end the war and carried a far higher price in human death and suffering."

Frank, who is writing a three-volume history of the Pacific war, said he continued to disagree with Hasegawa on the relative importance of the Soviet intervention and the A-bombs in forcing the surrender decision.

But he said they agreed that ultimate responsibility for what happened lay with Japan's government and Hirohito, who had decided in June to draft almost the entire population, men and most women, to fight to the death.

"Since no provision had been made to place these people in uniform, invading Allied troops would have not been able to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, effectively turning each village in Japan into a military target," Frank said.

The impact of the lightning Soviet advance comes through in the words of Japan's wartime prime minister, Kantaro Suzuki , urging his cabinet to surrender.

He is quoted in Hasegawa's book as saying, "If we miss (the chance) today, the Soviet Union will take not only Manchuria, Korea and Sakhalin, but also Hokkaido. We must end the war while we can deal with the United States."

V-J Day, the day Japan ceased fighting, came on Aug. 15 (Aug. 14 in the U.S.), and Japan's formal surrender followed on Sept. 2.

Dominic Lieven, a professor of Russian government at the London School of Economics, said anti-Soviet sentiment in the West tended to minimize Soviet military achievements.

Also, "very few Anglo-Americans saw the Soviet offensive in the Far East with their own eyes, and Soviet archives were not open to Western historians subsequently," he said.

More surprising, even in Russia the campaign was largely ignored. Although the scale of the Soviet victory was unprecedented, 12,000 dead against Japan hardly compared with the life-and-death struggle against Nazi Germany, in which 27 million Soviets died.

"The importance of the operation was huge," said retired Gen. Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, who took part in the 1945 campaign. "By entering the war with militarist Japan . the Soviet Union precipitated the end of World War II."

Lekic is based in Brussels. Associated Press writer Vladimir Isachenkov in Moscow contributed to this report.

The Orthodox Nationalist Archive

Dr Matthew Raphael Johnson is a researcher, writer and former professor of History and Political Science specialising in Russian history and political ideology. The Orthodox Nationalist is his weekly presentation on religion, history, politics and philosophy.

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The Orthodox Nationalist: St. Maximus the Confessor and Orthodox Platonism – TON 080719 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: ‘The Anti-Human’ and Pitesti Prison in Romania – TON 073119 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Mussolini's Humiliation in the Greco-Italian War – TON 072419 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Nationalism of Gen. Omar al-Bashir of Sudan – TON 071719 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Prof Ariel Toaff and Ritual Murder – TON 070319 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Stalin the Zionist – TON 022619 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Rape of Nanking: Fact or Fiction? – TON 061919 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: America and Fantasy Land – TON 061219 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Vladimir Solovyov and the Russian Rejection of Empiricism – TON 060519 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Myth of the Nordic Origins of Old Russia – TON 052919 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Boris Vysheslavtsev – TON 052219 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Some Clarifications in Orthodox Theology – TON 051519 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Principles in Biblical Interpretation – TON 050819 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Emperor Justinian Part 2 – TON 050119 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Emperor Justinian – TON 042419 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Vietnam War – TON 041719 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Alexander Solzhenitsyn Part II – TON 041019 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: A New Look at the Armenian Earthquake of 1988 – TON 040219 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Political Theory Part 1 – TON 032719 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: General Alexander Lebed – TON 032019 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Myth About Islam in China & Burma – TON 031319 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Psychology of Dostoevsky – TON 030619 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Notes From The Underground – TON 022719 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Vasyl Stus, the Ukrainian Solzhenitsyn – TON 022019 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Adam Kadmon as ‘Antichrist’ – TON 021319 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Peter I and the Old Believers – TON 020619 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Social Nationalism in Venezuela – TON 013019 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Lies and Myths About the Anti-Communists of Latin America II – TON 012319 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Lies and Myths About the Anti-Communists of Latin America I –TON 011619 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Pornography – TON 010819 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Marxism is Leninism – TON 010219 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Stalingrad Debacle and its Causes – TON 122618 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Historical Frauds, Chernobyl and Korean Air 007 – TON 121918 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Myths and Lies of the 1960’s – TON 121218 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Tsar Boris Godunov and the Oligarchy – TON 120518 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Russian Hoax Exposer Acquitted – TON 112818 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: A Brief Glossary of Terms – TON 112118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Otto Bauer and the "Austro-Marxist" School –TON 111418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Doctrine of the 'Aerial Toll Houses' – TON 110718 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: "Saint" Oscar Romero & the El Salvador Civil War – TON 103118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Jews, Kabbalah and the Protestant Reformation – TON 102418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Origin of the Schism Between Constantinople, Kiev and Moscow – TON 101718 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: An Orthodox View of Fatima – TON 101018 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Fascism and the Decay of Political Debate – TON 200318 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Leo Strauss and the Destruction of Thought – TON 092618 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Syrian Social Nationalist Party – TON 091218 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Christ and Christianity Are Greek – TON 090518 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Patriarch Bartholomew and the Dionysian Consolidation of Liberalism – TON 082918 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus – TON 082218 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Iran and the Failure of the American Republican-Capitalist Model – TON 081518 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Free Trade as the Foundation for Liberalism and Globalization – TON 080818 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Reign of Emperor St. John III of Nicaea – TON 080118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Helsinki, Trump and the Twilight of Oligarchy – TON 072518 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The 100 Year Anniversary of the Martyrdom of the Tsar and his Family II – TON 071818 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The 100 Year Anniversary of the Martyrdom of the Tsar and His Family – TON 071118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Moral Philosophy of Metropolitan Antony Khrapovitsky – TON 070418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Aristocratic Existentialism of Nikolai Berdyaev – TON 062718 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Last Days II – TON 062018 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Orthodox Church, Female Nature and Reason as the Male Burden – TON 061318 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Lev Gumilev and the Theory of Ethnogenesis II – TON 060618 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Lev Gumilev and the Theory of Ethnogenesis I – TON 053018 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: St. Justin the Philosopher – TON 052318 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: What Did Hegel Mean by Dialectics? – TON 051618 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The US Military and the End of the World – TON 050918 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Triumph of Major-General Peter Grigorenko – TON 050218 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: St. Maxim the Greek and the Italian Renaissance in Russia – TON 042518 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: China and Tibet in Tsarist Foreign Policy – TON 041818 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: America on Drugs and the War in Afghanistan – TON 041118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Ioannis Metaxas and the Greek Corporate State – TON 040418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Last Days – TON 032818 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Bishop Diomede of Chukotka and the Heresy of "Sergianism" – TON 032118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: War Against Lucifer and the Struggle of Esphgmenou – TON 031418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: A Statement Concerning the Necessity of Racism – TON 030718 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Vision of the Kollyvades Fathers – TON 022818 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Political Mission of Gen. Milan Nedic of Serbia – TON 022118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Poland Declares War on the New World Order - TON 021418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Construction of New Khazaria in Ukraine - TON 020718 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 - TON 013118 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Myths About Russia That Won’t Die - TON 012418 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Ethno-Monarchist Thought of Ivan Solonevich - TON 011718 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Oswald Spengler and the Destruction of Intelligence - TON 011018 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: St Paisii and the Beginning of Bulgarian Nationalism - TON 010318 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Alexei Khomiakov and Aryan Orthodoxy - TON 122817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: General Suharto the Savior of Asia - TON 122017 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: General Park Chung-Hee, the Greatest Asian leader of the 20th Century - TON 121317 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Russian ‘Hacking’ and Johnson’s Law - TON 120617 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Soviet Ideology, Western Delusion and the ROC in the USSR - TON 112917 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Usury and Passion - The Revolt of the Byzantine Zealots in Thessaloniki (1342-1350) – TON 112217 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Deadly Errors of Patriarch Gabriel of Serbia – TON 110817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Inter-Racial Marriage – TON 110117 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Catherine the Great’s War on the Orthodox Church – TON 102517 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Old Ruthenian Struggle – TON 101817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Hoaxes, False Flags and the Mass Mind – TON 101117 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Refuting a Pagan Origin for Christ – TON 100417 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Gas Wars in Eastern Europe – TON 092717 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Essence of Words – TON 092017 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Archbishop Averky and the Antichrist – TON 091317 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Modern Day Sergianism – TON 090617 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Slavophiles – TON 083017 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Revolutionary Jewish Roots of Antifa – TON 082317 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Judaism in Medieval Novgorod – TON 080917 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Paganism is Not a Religion – TON 080217 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Explaining Dugin – TON 072617 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Ritual Murder of the Russian Royal Family – TON 071917 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Historical Riddle of Birobidzhan – TON 071217 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Putin – TON 062817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Tsar St. Paul I - The Restorer of Old Russia – TON 062117 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Nikolai Ustryalov and National Bolshevism in Russia – TON 061417 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Hetman Skoropadsky and the Rebirth of Ukraine – TON 060717 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Arthur and the Legend of the Sword – TON 053117 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Symphony of Powers II – TON 052417 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Jurisdiction of Truth – TON 051017 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Pikeville - The End of Antifa – TON 050317 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Symphony of Powers – TON 042617 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Defending the Khazar Thesis of the Origin of Modern Jewry – TON 041817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Michael Karkoc - The Latest Victim of Jewish Hysteria – TON 032217 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Prince Vladimir Monomakh and the Anti-Usury Uprising – TON 031517 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Globalism and the ‘Great Council’ of the Phanar – TON 030817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Tsar Nicholas and the Black Hundreds – TON 022217 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Sergei Bulgakov and Sophia – TON 020817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Metaphysics of Alexei Losev – TON 020117 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Rasputin and the War Against Trump – TON 012517 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Prince St Daniel and Mediaeval Russia – TON 011817 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Death of Old Russia – TON 010417 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Mystic Emperor Michael II – TON 122816 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Modern Destruction of ‘Self’ – TON 122116 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Haidamak Revolt – TON 121416 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Effect of Eurasianism on Geopolitics – TON 120716 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Thoughts of Petre Tutea – TON 120116 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: National Socialism in Bulgaria and Moldova? – TON 111516 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Civic Activism in the Age of Death - TON 110916 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Albania’s Alliance With Globalism – TON 102516 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The War Against Putin – TON 101816 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: New Russia and the Rise of the Republics – TON 101116 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Codreanu and the Iron Guard – TON 100416 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Will Creates the World – TON 092716 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Valery Bryusov and the Mystic Anarchists – TON 091316 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Christian Anarcho-Nationalism in the USSR – TON 060916 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Traditionalism on Trial – TON 083016 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Nationalist Philosophy vs Marxist Deception – TON 082316 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Neplyuev and the Labor Brotherhood of the Holy Cross – TON 080916 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Truth Behind the ‘Tsarist Pogroms’ – TON 080216 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Destruction of Yugoslavia – TON 072616 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Tsar Nicholas – The Loss of a Great Man – TON 071916 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Stalin the Philo-Semitic Internationalist – TON 071216 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Trump’s Campaign and Elite-Financed Hate – What Does the Law Say? – TON 070516 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Women as the New Nobility in America – TON 062916 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Russian Nationalist Philosopher - Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin – TON 062116 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Homosexual Pathology and the ‘Pulse’ Shootings – TON 061416 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Leon Trotsky and the Permanent Oligarchy – TON 060716 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Alexander Dugin's Philosophical Foundations – TON 053116 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Was Erich Koch Working for Stalin? – TON 051916 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Great Cossack Hetman - Ivan Sirko – TON 051716 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: National Socialism in Russia – TON 050316 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: Valentine Katasonov and the Occult History of Capitalism – TON 042716 Link

The Orthodox Nationalist: The Phyletism Hoax – TON 041916 Link

China Betrayed Into Communism

Although the mass media present China today as “progressive,” especially after the 2008 Olympics fanfare, it remains among the world’s cruelest regimes.

The term “Red China” is not anachronistic. Though certainly less oppressive than during the Cultural Revolution, when it executed millions, China is still governed by a single regime, the Communist Party, which requires members to be atheists. It imprisons dissidents without due process, oppresses Tibet, and enforces a policy, backed by compulsory abortion, restricting most families to one child. (Since Chinese traditionally prefer male offspring, this has led to disproportionate abortion — even infanticide — of female babies, creating an artificial majority of males in China.) The government directly controls most media, blocking criticisms of itself on the Internet.

Perhaps worst is suppression of religious freedom. Christian churches, though permitted, must submit to government control and censorship — either as part of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement or Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. Independent house churches, comprising some 90 percent of China’s Christians, face persecution. The Voice of the Martyrs reports:

The human rights record in China is one of the worst in the world. Its system of “re-education through labor” detains hundreds of thousands each year in work camps without even a court hearing…. The house church movement (unregistered churches) endures unimaginable persecution, yet stands on its commitment to preach the gospel, no matter the cost. China continued its crackdown against Christians and missionaries in 2008, as they sought to purge the country of religion before hosting the Olympic games…. Church property and Bibles were confiscated. Christians were harassed, questioned, arrested and imprisoned. Christians in prisons are routinely beaten and abused.

Japan and Manchuria

What surprises many Americans: the regime ruling China was largely put there by the United States. In the 1930s, Japan, then militarily powerful, was the main barrier to Soviet ambitions to communize Asia. Benjamin Gitlow, founding member of the U.S. Communist Party, wrote in I Confess (1940):

When I was in Moscow, the attitude toward the United States in the event of war was discussed. Privately, it was the opinion of all the Russian leaders to whom I spoke that the rivalry between the United States and Japan must actually break out into war between these two.

The Russians were hopeful that the war would break out soon, because that would greatly secure the safety of Russia’s Siberian borders and would so weaken Japan that Russia would no longer have to fear an attack from her in the East…. Stalin is perfectly willing to let Americans die in defense of the Soviet Union.

In 1935, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow William C. Bullitt sent a dispatch to Secretary of State Cordell Hull:

It is … the heartiest hope of the Soviet Government that the United States will become involved in war with Japan…. To think of the Soviet Union as a possible ally of the United States in case of war with Japan is to allow the wish to be father to the thought. The Soviet Union would certainly attempt to avoid becoming an ally until Japan had been thoroughly defeated and would then merely use the opportunity to acquire Manchuria and Sovietize China.

In the 1930s Japan moved troops into Manchuria (northern China). U.S. history books routinely call this an imperialistic invasion. While there is certainly truth in this interpretation, the books rarely mention that Japan was largely reacting, in its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, to the Soviets’ incursions into Asia — namely their seizure of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. Anthony Kubek, Chairman of Political Science at the University of Dallas, wrote in How the Far East Was Lost:

It was apparent to Japanese statesmen that unless bastions of defense were built in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, Communism would spread through all of North China and seriously threaten the security of Japan. To the Japanese, expansion in Manchuria was a national imperative…. But the Department of State seemed not to regard Japan as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in North China. As a matter of fact, not one word of protest was sent by the Department of State to the Soviet Union, despite her absorption of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, while at the same time Japan was censured for stationing troops in China.

The Chinese Republic

China had been ruled by emperors until 1911, when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown. The revolution is largely attributed to Sun Yat-sen, who sought to make China a constitutional republic, led by the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party of China. However, Sun encountered extreme difficulties in unifying the enormous nation under his idealistic principles. After the emperors’ fall, China was largely ruled by local warlords, and following Dr. Sun’s 1925 death, the task of unifying China fell to Chiang Kai-shek, a Christian and Kuomintang leader.

The Soviets tried infiltrating the Kuomintang, but Chiang Kai-shek eventually saw through their schemes, and by 1928 had deported many USSR agents. That same year, 1928, Foreign Affairs, American’s most powerful foreign policy journal, published its first article criticizing Chiang. From then on, he became the enemy of both the Soviet Union and the American establishment — which had ironically sought to support communism since the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Chinese Reds: Soviet Puppets

The Chinese Communist Party was little more than a puppet of the Soviet Union, which recognized the value for communism’s future in China’s massive manpower. In 1933, the Chinese Communist Party sent this message to Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin: “Lead us on, O our pilot, from victory to victory!”

Stalin encouraged the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. However, with Japanese troops’ arrival in Manchuria in 1937, Stalin ordered Chinese communists to ease their attacks on the Nationalists because the latter were repelling the Japanese, whom Stalin considered a barrier to his own ambitions in Asia.

This order was amplified after June 22, 1941, when Germany and its European allies invaded the Soviet Union, and began decimating the Red Army. Stalin feared that Japan — Germany’s ally — would invade Russia from the East, destroying himself and world communism’s center. One may reasonably conclude that proven Soviet agents within the U.S. government — such as Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Alger Hiss, a leading State Department figure — shared this concern.

This author has documented in The New American that Washington had full foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack, but did not warn our military commanders and also that Washington sought to provoke the attack through such measures as a freeze on Japan’s U.S. assets a steel and oil embargo closure of the Panama Canal to Japan’s shipping and humiliating ultimatums to the Japanese government (see, for example, Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised FDR Was Not).

The U.S. war with Japan fulfilled the Gitlow and Bullitt warnings. Since Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists were also fighting the Japanese, official U.S. policy was to support them, especially after President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Chiang at the 1943 Cairo Conference. Stalin ordered the Chinese communists to help against the Japanese too — but in a very limited capacity. Chinese communist leader Mao Tse-tung told followers: “Our determined policy is 70 percent self-development, 20 percent compromise, and 10 percent fight the Japanese.” The Reds spent little energy against the Japanese, mostly attacking the Nationalists, whom they planned to overthrow at the war’s conclusion. This emphasis increased as Japan’s defeat, from U.S. advances in the Pacific, became imminent. Robert Welch, in his study of China’s downfall, Again, May God Forgive Us, wrote: “In Shantung in 1943, just for one illustration, they [the communists] attacked from the south an army of twenty thousand Nationalists, simultaneously with a Japanese attack from the north, and helped to slaughter the whole force.”

Roosevelt’s Betrayal

But China’s destruction came not only from communists. Fateful decisions resulted when Roosevelt met with Stalin at the Teheran Conference (late 1943) and Yalta Conference (February 1945). Stalin, though our ally against Germany during World War II, maintained a nonaggression pact with Japan. This suited Stalin, as he wished the Japanese to wear down China’s Nationalist forces.

At the Teheran and Yalta wartime conferences, however, Roosevelt asked Stalin if he would break his pact with Japan and enter the Far East war. Stalin agreed, but attached conditions. He demanded that America completely equip his Far Eastern Army for the expedition, with 3,000 tanks, 5,000 planes, plus all the other munitions, food, and fuel required for a 1,250,000-man army. Roosevelt accepted this demand, and 600 shiploads of Lend-Lease material were convoyed to the USSR for the venture. Stalin’s Far Eastern Army swiftly received more than twice the supplies we gave Chiang Kai-shek during four years as our ally.

General Douglas MacArthur protested after discovering that ships designated to supply his Pacific forces were being diverted to Russia. Major General Courtney Whitney wrote: “One hundred of his transport ships were to be withdrawn immediately, to be used to carry munitions and supplies across the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladivostok…. Later, of course, they were the basis of Soviet military support of North Korea and Red China.”

But Stalin didn’t just want materiel in return for entering the Asian war. He also demanded control of the Manchurian seaports of Dairen and Port Arthur — which a glance at the map shows would give him an unbreakable foothold in China — as well as joint control, with the Chinese, of Manchuria’s railroads. Roosevelt made these concessions without consulting the Chinese. Thus, without authority, he ceded to Stalin another nation’s sovereign territory. The president made these pledges without the knowledge or consent of Congress or the American people.

The State Department official representing the United States in drawing up the Yalta agreement was Alger Hiss — subsequently exposed as a Soviet spy. General Patrick Hurley, U.S. Ambassador to China, wrote: “American diplomats surrendered the territorial integrity and the political independence of China … and wrote the blueprint for the Communist conquest of China in secret agreement at Yalta.”

The decision to invite and equip Stalin — a known aggressor — into the Far East must go down among the worst acts of U.S. foreign policy. Stalin’s divisions entered China to fight the already-beaten Japanese on August 9, 1945 — five days before Japan’s surrender. The atom bomb had already pounded Hiroshima.

After barely firing a shot, the Soviets received surrender of Japan’s huge arsenals in Manchuria. These, with their American Lend-Lease supplies, they handed over to Mao Tse-tung’s communists to overthrow the Nationalist government.

Vinegar Joe

Another means of destroying the Nationalists: U.S. personnel assigned to China. Among the worst was Army General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell. Though generally respected as a strategist, Stilwell became notorious for hatred of Chiang Kai-shek — whom he nicknamed “the peanut” — and admiration for the communists. Stilwell wrote in a letter: “It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.” (Chu was commander-in-chief of the Chinese communist armies — as he was later in the Korean War, overseeing the killing of GIs.)

Because Japan controlled China’s ports, the Nationalists had to receive supplies by air lift from India. Stilwell oversaw a campaign of Chinese troops against the Japanese in Burma, attempting to open a land supply route. When the effort failed, Stilwell demanded the operation be tried again, using 30 Nationalist divisions.

At this, Chiang balked: diverting 30 divisions south into Burma would facilitate further conquest of China by both the Japanese and the Chinese communists. General Claire Chennault, commander of the famed “Flying Tigers,” agreed with Chiang. Significantly, Stilwell did not request use of communist forces — whom he so vocally admired — for his envisioned Burma campaign.

Stilwell complained to Washington, and received a message from President Roosevelt directing Chiang to place Stilwell in “unrestricted command” of all Chinese forces, and send troops to Burma. After jubilantly handing this message to Chiang, Stilwell wrote in his diary:

I’ve long waited for vengeance —
At last I’ve had my chance.
I’ve looked the Peanut in the eye
And kicked him in the pants…
The little b*****d shivered
And lost the power of speech.
His face turned green and quivered
And he struggled not to screech.

But Stilwell’s scheme backfired. Chiang refused the directive and asked Roosevelt to replace Stilwell. Otherwise, he said, he would go it alone against the Japanese — as he had for the four years preceding Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt was forced to concede. To his chagrin, Stilwell was relieved by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who saw eye-to-eye with Chiang.

Chiang Kai-shek wrote: “Stilwell was in a conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow the Government” — an opinion shared by General Hurley, who stated: “The record of General Stilwell in China is irrevocably coupled in history with the conspiracy to overthrow the Nationalist Government of China, and to set up in its place a Communist regime — and all this movement was part of, and cannot be separated from, the Communist cell or apparatus that existed at the time in the Government in Washington.”

State Department Junta

What “cell” did Ambassador Hurley refer to? In China, he was surrounded by a State Department clique favoring a Chinese communist takeover. Dean Acheson, who as a young attorney had represented Soviet interests in America, became Assistant Secretary of State in 1941. As such, he ensured the State Department’s Far Eastern Division was dominated by communists and pro-communists, including Alger Hiss (subsequently proven a Soviet spy) John Carter Vincent, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, later identified by Daily Worker editor Louis Budenz as a communist John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer in China who turned State Department information over to the Chinese communists, and was arrested by the FBI in the Amerasia spy case (about which more later) Foreign Service Officer John P. Davies, who consistently lobbied for the communists Owen Lattimore, appointed U.S. adviser to Chiang Kai-shek but identified as a communist by ex-communists Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley and several others.

“The Communists relied very strongly on Service and John Carter Vincent,” said Budenz, “in a campaign against Ambassador Hurley.” Hurley, an honest statesman, was shocked by the maneuverings of those under him. “The professional foreign service men,” he reported to President Truman, “sided with the Communists’ armed party.”

Hurley was compelled to dismiss 11 State Department members. Upon return from China, however, they were mysteriously promoted, and some became Hurley’s superiors — after which he resigned. “These professional diplomats,” he wrote, “were returned to Washington and were placed in the Far Eastern and China divisions of the State Department as my supervisors.”

Pro-communist Stratagems

This State Department clique employed several tactics to advance Chinese communism. Among the chief: claiming Mao’s followers weren’t communists, but merely “agrarian reformers.” Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto had commanded: “Workers of the world, unite!” But since China had little industry, Chinese communists made farmers their focus.

Professor Kenneth A. Colgrove testified that Owen Lattimore informed him that “Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were real democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no connection with Soviet Russia.”

The aforementioned John Carter Vincent referred to Mao and his followers as “so-called Communists.”

Raymond Ludden, another in the State Department clique, reported that “the so-called Communists are agrarian reformers of a mild democratic stripe more than anything else.”

In 1943, T. A. Bisson wrote in Far Eastern Survey: “By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed ‘communism’ it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy applied mainly to agrarian conditions.”

The State Department’s John P. Davies told Washington: “The Communists are in China to stay. And China’s destiny is not Chiang’s but theirs.” An additional tactic: portraying Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists as “fascists,” “reactionary,” and “corrupt.” General Wedemeyer conveyed this matter’s reality:

Although the Nationalist Government of China was frequently and derisively described as authoritarian or totalitarian, there was a basic difference between it and its Communist enemies, since the Kuomintang’s ultimate aim was the establishment of a constitutional republic, whereas the Communists want to establish a totalitarian dictatorship on the Soviet pattern. In my two years of close contact with Chiang Kai-shek, I had become convinced that he was personally a straightforward, selfless leader, keenly interested in the welfare of his people, and desirous of establishing a constitutional government.

While some corruption undoubtedly existed in the Nationalist regime, Wedemeyer insightfully noted that corruption existed in all governments, including ours. For China, a conspiracy on the U.S. side compounded this. Their government offices displaced by Japan’s invasion, the Nationalists had to rely on paper currency. Runaway inflation threatened China’s economy. To stabilize the situation, Chiang Kai-shek requested a loan of U.S. gold. President Roosevelt approved, but the gold shipments were delayed and withheld by Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White, long since proven to be a Soviet agent. This collapsed China’s currency. One can understand why some Chinese officials, forced to accept salaries paid in worthless money, turned to corruption.

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, informed the National Press Club in 1959: “We stood by and saw China drift into a state of complete economic collapse. The currency was worthless…. In China, we withheld our funds at the only time, in my opinion, we had a chance to save the situation. To do what? To force the Communists in.”

As a final tactic, State Department leftists demanded the Nationalists form a “coalition government” with the communists. This was an old communist trick. By forcing the postwar governments of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia to form coalitions with communists, the Marxists seized control of those nations Mao Tse-tung envisioned the same strategy for China. In his report “On Coalition Government,” made in April 1945 to the Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao predicted that a coalition would destroy both Chiang and “reactionary American imperialism.”

The State Department’s China clique echoed this call. John P. Davies wrote in 1944: “A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us.”

A more realistic assessment of coalition government — which meant combining constitutional freedom with totalitarian gangsterism — was provided by Douglas MacArthur, who said it would have “about as much chance of getting them together as that oil and water will mix.”

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek wanted a postwar government representing all Chinese parties. In November 1946, he convened a National Assembly that met for 40 days, with 2,045 delegates representing diverse views from all over China it adopted a national constitution. However, despite their clamoring for “coalition government,” Mao’s communists refused to participate: they knew that, lacking popular support in China, they could only take power by violence.

Marshall Mission

At World War II’s close, Mao’s troops, armed by the Russians — both from American Lend-Lease and captured Japanese arsenals — began a full assault on the Nationalist government. Mao’s rebellion would have undoubtedly failed if not for interventions by George Marshall, whom President Truman designated his special representative to China.

Marshall had a remarkable penchant for being in “the wrong place at the wrong time.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt had advanced him over dozens of senior officers to become U.S. Army Chief of Staff. In that capacity, on December 7, 1941, he absented himself from his office on a notoriously long “horseback ride,” while junior officers sought his permission to warn Pearl Harbor of the impending attack. During the Korean War, he was conveniently named Secretary of Defense as such he overruled General MacArthur, saving the Yalu River’s bridges from destruction by the U.S. Air Force, and thus permitting Communist Chinese soldiers to invade Korea, which precluded victory by MacArthur, guaranteeing the stalemate that ultimately occurred. Regardless of where Marshall served, his actions fortified communism and defeated American interests — a record summarized by the wrongfully maligned Senator Joseph McCarthy in his book America’s Retreat from Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall.

Before leaving for China, Marshall revealed he already accepted the communist propaganda line. Five-star Fleet Admiral William Leahy reported: “I was present when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang that he had to get on with the Communists or without help from us. He said the same thing when he got back.” And when told Mao Tse-tung and his followers were communists, Marshall remarked: “Don’t be ridiculous. These fellows are just old-fashioned agrarian reformers.”

When Marshall first arrived in China, the Nationalists outnumbered the communists 5-1 in both troops and rifles, and were successfully driving them back. Marshall, however, imposed a total of three truces — which the communists violated, allowing them to regroup, bring up Soviet supplies, and further train their guerillas. This expanded their control from 57 Chinese counties to 310. General Claire Chennault recounted the impact of Marshall’s truces:

North of Hankow some 200,000 government troops had surrounded 70,000 Communist troops and were beginning a methodical job of extermination. The Communists appealed to Marshall on the basis of his truce proposal, and arrangements were made for fighting to cease while the Communists marched out of the trap and on to Shantung Province, where a large Communist offensive began about a year later. On the East River near Canton some 100,000 Communist troops were trapped by government forces. The truce teams effected their release and allowed the Communists to march unmolested to Bias Bay where they boarded junks and sailed to Shantung.

Marshall’s disastrous 15-month China mission ended in January 1947. Upon his return to the United States, President Truman rewarded his failures with appointment as Secretary of State. Marshall imposed a weapons embargo on the Nationalists, while the communists continued receiving a steady weapons supply from the USSR. Marshall boasted that he disarmed 39 anti-communist divisions “with a stroke of the pen.” This doomed Chinese freedom.

The Media Role

Critical to the China sellout was manipulation of U.S. public opinion. A plethora of books and news reports perpetuated the myth that Mao’s communists were “democratic agrarian reformers,” even though, once in power, they established a totalitarian communist dictatorship, executing tens of millions of Chinese, in an orgy of atrocities that reached its height during the bloody Cultural Revolution. Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists were portrayed as “fascist,” “reactionary,” and “corrupt.”

Soviet Prime Minister Vyacheslav Molotov outlined this strategy:

Who reads the Communist papers? Only a few people who are already Communists. We don’t need to propagandize them. What is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists if we want to make them Communists or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infiltrate in the big press.

The most influential U.S. writers fulfilling this were probably Edgar Snow, author of the pro-communist book Red Star Over China, and Owen Lattimore, author of Thunder Out of China, a Book-of-the-Month selection that attacked Chiang Kai-shek. Writing in the Saturday Review, Snow audaciously told readers, “There has never been any communism in China.” And he reported in the Saturday Evening Post that Chu Teh, Mao’s military commander, possessed the “kindliness of Robert E. Lee, the tenacity of Grant and the humility of Lincoln.”

In his monumental book While You Slept, John T. Flynn exposed the media bias favoring Chinese communists. Between 1943 and 1949, 22 pro-communist books appeared in the U.S. press, and only seven pro-Nationalist ones. Also, reported Flynn:

Every one of the 22 pro-Communist books, where reviewed, received glowing approval in the literary reviews, I have named — that is, in the New York Times, the Herald-Tribune, the Nation, the New Republic and the Saturday Review of Literature. And every one of the anti-Communist books was either roundly condemned or ignored in these same reviews.

One reason the pro-communist books received such favor: reviews were written by writers of other such books. Flynn documented that 12 authors of the 22 pro-Red Chinese books wrote 43 complimentary reviews of the others’ books. This cozy “in-house” system guaranteed laudatory reviews. It left the American public — which generally knew little of Asian affairs — with indelible impressions. So severe was the bias, Flynn noted, that New York Times reviews were barely distinguishable from those in the communist Daily Worker.

Overt Betrayal: The IPR

Perhaps the most sinister influence on America’s Far East policy and opinion was the now-defunct Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The recipient of grants from the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations, the institute published hundreds of thousands of pamphlets on China for U.S. public schools and the military. These pamphlets extended the myth that the communists were “agrarian reformers” and the Nationalists “fascists.” The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee eventually found IPR included 54 persons connected with the communist world conspiracy. Among them were such communists or pro-communists as Alger Hiss, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Owen Lattimore, and John Stewart Service. Alexander Barmine, a brigadier general who defected from the Communist Army, testified IPR was “a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific.”

The IPR organized a magazine, Amerasia. In 1945, U.S. officials were shocked when Amerasia published an article reprinting — almost word-for-word — a top-secret government document. Agents of the OSS (the CIA’s forerunner) invaded Amerasia’s offices and discovered 1,800 documents stolen from the American government, including papers detailing the disposition of Nationalist army units in China. The magazine had been a cover for Soviet spying.

Although the FBI arrested numerous Amerasia employees for espionage, all the cases were either completely dismissed or dispensed with fines. John Stewart Service, despite arrest for giving stolen government documents to Amerasia editor Philip Jaffe, was rewarded by Dean Acheson, who put Service in charge of State Department placements and promotions. This was not the only time powerful “hidden hands” have conspired against American interests.

“Aid” to China

With Japan’s 1945 defeat, Lend-Lease aid, sitting in India and slated for the Nationalists, was either destroyed or dumped in the ocean. By 1948, due to Marshall’s weapons embargo, the Nationalist government faced nearly inevitable defeat by the communists, who continued receiving unlimited weapons from Russia. Former U.S. Ambassador William C. Bullitt testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1948:

The American government has not delivered to China a single combat plane or a single bomber since General Marshall in August, 1946, by unilateral action, broke the promise of the American Government to the Chinese Government and suspended all deliveries of planes…. As a means of pressure to compel Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to take Communists into the Chinese Government, General Marshall stopped all fulfillment of this program and dishonored the pledge of the United States.

Although Dean Acheson deceptively told Congress the Nationalists had received over $2 billion in U.S. aid, most was non-military or unusable. Colonel L. B. Moody, U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, clarified the realities:

1. The inevitable defeat of the Nationalist army was due to their deficit in items of infantry weapons and especially ammunition, and the Communist superiority in these items.

2. Military aid to the Chinese meant infantry weapons and ammunition above all else and it is “precisely these items which the United States has consistently denied, delayed or limited. Only passing reference will be made to the billions of mouldy cigarettes, blown-up guns, and junk bombs and disabled vehicles from the Pacific Islands which have been totalled up with other real or alleged aid in various State Department, Communist and leftist statements to create the impression that we have furnished the Nationalist government with hundreds of millions or billions of useful fighting equipment.”

In April 1948, Congress, apprised of the desperate situation, granted $125 million in military assistance to save Chiang’s government. However, the first of this aid did not reach the Nationalists until seven months later (when China had become an issue in the 1948 elections). By contrast, after the British defeat at Dunkirk, U.S. ships needed only eight days to be loaded with munitions bound for Britain. Anthony Kubek describes the first shipload reaching the Nationalists in late 1948:

Of the total number, 480 of the machine guns lacked spare parts, tripod mounts, etc. Thompson machine guns had no magazines or clips. There were no loading machines for the loading of ammunition belts. Only a thousand of the light machine guns had mounts, and there were only a thousand clips for the 2,280 light machine guns.

China Collapses

The embargo and subsequent sabotaging of congressionally mandated aid to the Nationalists spelled their doom. In 1949, the communists completed conquest of China. Chiang Kai-shek and approximately two million followers escaped to Formosa (now called Taiwan), where they maintained the Republic of China’s government, establishing the island as a bastion of freedom.

The propaganda myth that Mao Tse-tung was an “agrarian reformer” evaporated as he formed a totalitarian communist regime, slaughtering millions. Acheson and the State Department clique still hoped to recognize Communist China, but after Mao’s thugs seized U.S. consular officers, imprisoned and even murdered our citizens, and poured their troops into Korea to kill American soldiers, this U.S. recognition of China ended up being deferred for many years.

The China disaster did not result from “blunders.” Congressman Walter Judd, an acknowledged Far East expert, said: “On the law of averages, a mere moron once in a while would make a decision that would be favorable to the United States. When policies are advocated by any group which consistently work out to the Communists’ advantage, that couldn’t be happenstance.”

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